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THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN AND SUBSAHARAN AFRICA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.A., The Citadel, 1980
M.A. California State University, 1991

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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN AND SUBSAHARAN AFRICA by MAJ David S. Anderson, USA, 134 pages.

This study investigates the role of the Unified Command Plan in Subsaharan Africa. The United States' intervention in Somalia increased public awareness of Subsaharan Africa's problems and that region's potential for future deployments of military forces, especially to conduct operations other than war.

A discussion of the situation, brief historical overviews of the Unified Command Plan and Subsaharan Africa, and two test cases comprise the thesis. One of the cases--the US action in Somalia--occurred while the thesis was in progress. The other case, an American intervention in Liberia, is factual up to a point. A fictional scenario involving the US European Command completes the example.

The study concludes that the Unified Command Plan needs revision in order for the US to handle effectively any threats to its interests in the region. Recommended alternatives include a transfer of the Subsaharan Africa n region from the US European Command to the US Central Command. This transfer will allow the US to cope better with regional contingencies in both Europe and Subsaharan Africa.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I undertook this project for three reasons: to study US defense policy formulation and defense strategy; to learn more about Subsaharan Africa and US involvement in that neglected region; and, to develop a sensing for operations other than war in a secondary theater. I accomplished those goals. However, I have more questions about the future of US defense strategy and problems of unified command and control--especially where the dominant US interests remain difficult to define--than when I started this thesis. In particular, these questions concern peace-support missions and the evolving role of the US armed forces in them.

My thanks and gratitude to the following, without whose support and encouragement this project would not have been possible: Mr. Bob Walz, the Committee Chair; Dr. Roger Spiller, Second Reader; LTC Kevin Dopf; Dr. John Fishel; Dr. Sam Lewis; LTC Ted Davis; MAJ Brett Morris; and, LTC Tom Polmateer.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

The Research Question and Value of the Analysis

"How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be [provoked]...because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing."¹

Neville Chamberlain's statement, issued during a radio address on the eve of the partition of Czechoslovakia, epitomizes failure. Failure to keep an acceptable peace, failure to thwart aggression by diplomatic, economic, or informational means, and failure to recognize that faraway threats can evolve into nearby or adjacent ones. Chamberlain's experience is a reminder that the price of liberty and peace is vigilance. For the United States, the sole remaining superpower, this lesson is especially important--for the lack of an easily recognized threat could result in complacency, the deadly result of which could be a repeat of the events of the 1930's and 1940's.

The purpose of this thesis is to assess the Unified Command Plan (UCP) as it applies to Subsaharan Africa. This analysis examines the existence and extent of national security interests in Africa and the ability of the US to provide effective command and control to influence and protect those interests.

A complete, in-depth examination of the UCP and each of the unified and specified commands is beyond the scope of a project such as this. However, an examination of Sub-saharan Africa is both sufficiently limiting and important. Subsaharan Africa is the one region of the world consistently neglected by the UCP since its inception 46 years ago. All of Africa is assigned to US European Command except for Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti. These nations are the responsibility of US Central Command. Subsaharan Africa is defined by using the State Department's practice of including Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan, and all nations to the south, including island nations in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. This excludes the nations of North Africa, which are more Arab in character and more closely identified with the Middle East.

The research question is: Does the UCP, as structured, serve an effective purpose and provide an adequate command and management apparatus for contingency operations in Subsaharan Africa?

This thesis evaluates the utility and effectiveness of the current UCP to provide an adequate structure with which to conduct military operations in support of US national policy objectives and national security policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. This study is useful for three reasons:

First, research in this field will be useful to military planners and strategists charged with anticipating, organizing, planning, and executing military operations of varying intensity, but especially those designed to use minimal force.

Second, the study expands the base of research of an infrequently studied component of national security force structure and how it relates to Sub-Saharan Africa. Both the UCP and Sub-Saharan Africa are objectively reviewed and studied too infrequently. For example, the UCP is evaluated once each two years by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). However, the UCP names the CJCS as the office responsible for several areas of the world, thus maintaining partisan focus on the in-house biennial analysis.

Third, the study examines use and command and control of military forces in two different and non-traditional test cases. As the possibility of global war diminishes, the likelihood of US participation in military operations short of war, regional conflicts, or without overt force will grow. This is especially true should potential adversaries continue to doubt US national will. In addition, potential

for US involvement in Third World contingency operations is likely to grow.

The Background and Purpose

It is axiomatic that since the end of World War II, Americans fight exclusively in countries, about which we generally know nothing. During the past 52 years, American troops have fought and died in many nations and for a variety of objectives, but always in what are considered Third World countries. Paradoxically, the US has almost exclusively prepared for a war in Europe against the former Soviet Union, which it never engaged in direct combat.

The probability of future armed conflict in the Third World is high: Korea, Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, and Iraq are all commonly considered Third World countries, and each has seen a large deployment of American military force to combat aggression and restore peace and domestic order. The Third World in general and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular often served as a surrogate battlefield for the superpowers during the Cold War. Despite the demise of the USSR, Third World countries will likely remain battlefields indefinitely, either due to internal problems that the government cannot eliminate or due to localized international aggression. In both the Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf War, the localized aggression of Iraq resulted in high intensity combat.

When the National Command Authorities direct military action in the national interest, the responsibility to perform that action devolves to one or more of the ten unified and specified commanders-in-chief. Organized along functional and geographical lines, the unified and specified commands are combatant commands, organizations whose broad, continuing missions support the national interests with military power. Together, these commands comprise the system defined in the Unified Command Plan.

During the Cold War, the United States' primary adversary was the Soviet Union. Most US national policy formulated during that era oriented on the strategy of containment: halting the spread of worldwide communism. The continents of Europe, Asia, South America, and Africa served primarily as surrogate battlefields on which the two superpowers fought battles of ideology and economics. Since 1947 and the creation of the UCP, military activities on those battlefields have been directed and controlled through one or more operational commands. Over the years, the operational commands have evolved into their present structure of nine unified and one specified commands.

One of the primary issues that now dominates US national defense policy and military strategy is the future use of military power. With the communist threat all but eliminated,² the validity of the UCP is in question. What is the threat? Is the UCP viable? Is the structure of the

UCP an anachronism, rendered superfluous by the disintegration of the Soviet Union?" Should it be revised to embrace new political geography or should it remain organized as a mix of function and geography?

During this transitional period from a certain, overt, and well-publicized threat to one of unknown origin, national policy-makers are likely to have more questions than answers. In recent speeches, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney has postulated during the next presidential administration, the US "will face tougher challenges, more difficult problems... in the international arena than anything we've had to deal with over the course of the last four or five years."⁴ The current UCP ensures that all regions of the world fall under the scrutiny of a US military commander. Without an overt threat, the organization of the UCP is an issue of great significance.

One of the potential problems is the risk posed by armed conflict resulting from political and economic instability in Africa. Until very recently, US strategists and planners oriented on Subsaharan Africa concentrated their research efforts on combatting counterinsurgency, a form of low-intensity conflict (LIC). However, thanks to arms proliferation, many of the poorest nations on earth can raise the intensity of warfare.

Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan write in their 1978 book, Force Without War, that between the years

1946 and 1975, the US exercised its military muscle no fewer than 215 times. Only a few operations involved ground forces. Others were unheralded 'presence'-type missions (in which a small contingent, usually a Navy vessel, operated near a real or potential crisis). Only eight of these were in Subsaharan Africa, and most of these were in the Congo (now Zaire).⁵ Since 1975, however, the world has changed significantly, and in the past three years alone, American troops have conducted three separate actions in Liberia and Somalia.

In his book Limited War Revisited, Robert Osgood writes that

as a general threat to international stability, the diffusion of modern military capabilities among middle-range powers and the increasing number of militarily significant independent actors affecting the international system could be more troublesome to US interests than all the wars of national liberation in the 1960's.⁶

Osgood supports his assertion using African examples. Observing that the number of major international conflicts increased during the 1970's (compared to the 1960's), he noted that the traditionally lightly armed subsaharan African region showed the most dramatic increase. Six years later, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger also noted the proliferation of advanced arms in the region and predicted tough challenges for the US as a result.⁷

The National Military Strategy establishes four principles, originally outlined during a speech in Aspen,

Colorado by President George Bush on August 2, 1990: Strategic Deterrence; Forward Presence; Crisis Response; and, Reconstitution.* Bush's principles assumed a leadership role for the US, an understandable role for the world's sole remaining superpower. In addition, the growing drug and refugee problems expand the opportunities for the use of military forces in operations other than war.

Understanding how America might be involved militarily in subsaharan Africa is necessary if realistic policies and preparations and command relationships are to be formulated and implemented. The military capabilities and motivations of the local actors and the broad spectrum of potential conflict affects the ability of the US to influence events either by projecting military power or by other means. Regional conflicts, economic interests and capabilities, ethnic conflict, and political instability all exert their influence on US policy makers charged with establishing national objectives in Subsaharan Africa.

The US has a sophisticated and unified command and management apparatus designed to control the movements and employment of its military forces, yet has few stated interests or objectives in Subsaharan Africa. Indications are that regional conflict will grow as result of mixing changing politico-economic influence and volatile ethnic tensions. What is the point of this apparatus if not to focus

on national interests, plan for their preservation, and exercise their protection?

Methodology

The Strategic Analysis Methodology (See Figure 1, Appendix) provides an appropriate approach to studying Sub-Saharan Africa. Its instability, large amount of foreign involvement, and lack of US influence on the continent demand a study through consideration of many factors.

In this thesis, the application of the methodology's first step reveals two closely related questions rather than problems. The dual focus is reasonable and has currency, especially given the myriad of changes experienced over recent years.

The second step identifies national interests and elements of national power. America's dominant interest in Africa is hard to isolate. It may be geographic, economic, humanitarian, or some combination of those and other interests. The UCP provides the command structure of one of the four elements of national power, the military (the remaining elements are diplomatic, economic, and information).

The third step considers other actors, their interests, and their elements of power. Other actors may be allies or neighboring peoples as well as adversaries. In some cases, other actors could be different ethnic groups or nations that conduct large amounts of trade in a region. An

emerging actor in many parts of the world is the natural environment. Nations are quickly becoming aware of ecology and the effects of overexploiting their natural resources. In Africa, the environment is a major factor and has considerable impact on the courses of action available to both the US and other political entities.

In the fourth step, scenarios are developed and tested; in Subsaharan Africa, humanitarian relief, peace-keeping, and non-combatant evacuation are the possibilities most likely to cause the commitment of US forces.

In the final step, recommendations and caveats to the resulting product provide realistic answers to questions and problems. In this thesis, other factors such as the budget or real-time missions may have an impact and skew the data. To use a popular colloquialism, "the truth may change."

Limitations on Research

Several factors limited the scope and breadth of this study.

First, the historic proximity of recent events caused many of the more scholarly and informed writings to lose their immediacy. This increased the difficulty of the evaluative process. Ironically, events in Somalia have progressed beyond the "what if?" stage, increasing dependence on current print and visual media as a source of information.

Second, no classified sources were used except the Unified Command Plan itself. The formal, written, UCP provided background and a better understanding of the evolution of the plan itself, but it was not critical to the study. An unclassified diagram of the operational command areas serves as a summary of the UCP without loss of understanding.

Third, the study of the components of national security policy reveals the vastness of the subject itself. Intricate, often vague, and in a state of perpetual motion, yesterday's truth is frequently tomorrow's misleading assumption. As a result, the expanse of the subject matter serves as its own limitation. It was difficult to determine which would be the most useful.

Fourth, the background material on Subsaharan Africa tends to polarize the continent and its problems. Many sources isolate the traditional US-USSR rivalry as the origin of issues needing resolution. However, little material is available on ethnic divisions or the widespread economic catastrophes, and too few objective histories exist on colonial or post-colonial Africa.

Literature Review

By comparison with other elements of US military power, the independent study of the Unified and Specified Commands is infrequent, though the UCP has been updated regularly since its inception. Since 1986, CJCS is required

to review the UCP every two years. However, a great deal of literature addresses national security policy, strategic use of military forces, operations short of war, and proposed use of military options in the future.

James H. Dixon's National Security Policy Formulation: Institutions, Processes, and Issues served as a primer and a starting point to begin this analysis. Though it is nine years old and pre-dates the reforms made under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, Dixon's book retains its relevance, especially for the novice. Its passages on the interaction of individuals, institutions and their collective decisions that result in national security policy are critical to establishing a neophyte's level of basic understanding.

Another volume useful in gaining an understanding of the military side of security strategy is Edward Luttwak's The Pentagon and The Art of War. Luttwak argues in his book (like Dixon's, written several years before Goldwater-Nichols) that the reform of the defense establishment is overdue. Many of the questions and points raised have been answered and countered by Goldwater-Nichols. A central theme is the reminder that the US defense establishment continues to enlarge, expand, and endure repairs to a 50 year old superstructure. Without comprehensive reform of its command and control systems, something will eventually fail.

The Senate Armed Services Committee report, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, is the document that stimulated the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. It is a "snapshot in time" of the armed forces prior to the most recent reforms. It quantifies the discrepancies between the Defense Department's structural composition and the corporate requirements.

The Unified Command Plan, though neither a lengthy nor detailed document, provides the official basis for worldwide US military structure, its roles and missions. Superseded versions of the UCP provide a historical perspective of command relationships and geographic responsibilities.

Making Strategy, a book by Colonel Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow, applies the same beginner-oriented methodology found in National Security Policy Formulation. A significant section of the book addresses operations other than war. It also addresses US involvement in crises where its national interests are ill-defined. Above all, the book reminds the reader that the strategies used to win an Operation Desert Storm are different from those applicable to the drug war or countering a hostage crisis.

Former Undersecretary of Defense Robert W. Komer's Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense? focused on non-nuclear, conventional military-based options. He specifically questioned whether the US will continue to stress

unilateral "maritime force projection even at the expense of sea control" or modify priorities and adopt a policy of building a multilateral coalition before taking direct action. His argument is moot, especially in consideration of the recent Persian Gulf War. The US' tendency to act unilaterally will remain. On occasion, it is required (e.g., Panama). A recurring theme throughout Komer's book is the inability of the US armed forces to render unified strategic advice. The elevation in authority of unified commanders has not eliminated service parochialism. Competition for more generous portions of the budget continues to remain a dominant factor in the development of strategic planning.

Stephen D. Krasner's book, Structural Conflict, reviews the Third World's quest for power in a North-South context. Krasner's thesis is that Third World nations fail to compete successfully with more developed nations when their economies are based on market-oriented principles. To compensate, they adopt authoritarian economies and political systems. Northern nations react unfavorably to the constant threat of political instability in the Third World and either withdraw or reduce their support. Thus the Third World is caught in a no-win situation. Krasner's book addressed these questions in global context. His analysis helped interpret the Third World quest for stability and credibility.

Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan collaborative effort, Force Without War examines nine incidents of US force projection for political purposes between 1951 and 1971. They conclude that the introduction of US military forces stabilizes nations where decaying political structures threaten US and international interests long enough for diplomacy to avert further crisis. None of their in-depth case studies involved African nations. However, their conclusions about the objectives, contextual use of force, and the nature and activity of forces involved apply regardless of geography.

Two books that were especially helpful in determining the feasibility of military activities in Africa were Alternative Military Strategies for the Future, edited by Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier, and Military Intervention in the Third World, edited by John H. Maurer and Richard A. Porth.

Both books predate the end of the Soviet Union and consider it the most likely threat of several present or emerging in the Third World. Both books recognize the necessity of the US to rely on multinational coalitions to win its future conflicts and both propose that the US adopt a joint military strategy. Neither concept is new. The authors applied these ideas to the Third World, saying that even in these poorer, less sophisticated, countries, the West faces serious challenges.

Many sources concerning Subsaharan Africa were available but dated--only periodicals addressed the end of superpower competition on the continent. Nevertheless, several books provided a wealth of information on the security needs and military aspects of Subsaharan Africa in the context of Soviet involvement. Kenneth Adelman's African Realities and Bruce E. Arlinghaus' African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability, Solidarity and African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities (which he co-edited with Pauline H. Baker), were among the most valuable references.

Dr. Adelman, a security expert, considered Africa a major actor of the US-USSR dispute. He provided suggestions--based on his historical examinations of post-World War II US activities--to better manage America's African policies. Dr. Arlinghaus was an active duty Army officer when he produced the bulk of his work on Africa. He lends a special level of credibility to his recommendations and conclusions about military subjects. Dr. Arlinghaus focused on the ebb and flow of superpower arms sales and transfers in the region, a market no longer dominated by the US and USSR. The potential buyers of sophisticated weapons still remain interested. The economic problems confronting Russia and other USSR successor states reinforce his arguments. The number of nations with arms to sell to Africa in exchange for hard currency will continue to grow.

David A. Dickson's work, United States Foreign Policy Towards Subsaharan Africa, was written as a history of US-African relations from post-World War II to 1984. It examines in its final chapters the Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement. Dickson concluded that US has recognized few vital national interests in Africa, except for containment of communism and a desire to contribute to international order. His book examines the history of the policy and is very helpful in understanding the on-again, off-again US involvement in Africa.

Beyond Constructive Engagement: United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa, edited by Elliot P. Skinner, contains thoughtful essays, commentaries, and discussions on issues of US-African policy during the Reagan administration. William J. Foltz's "United States Military and Strategic Interests in Africa," and William J. Lewis's "United States Response to Inter-African Regional Problems and Prospects: Foreign Policy in a Turbulent Age" are particularly good. Foltz reviews both strategic and operational concerns of African geography and politics, concluding that American strategic interests are best served through a more aggressive security assistance program. Lewis's article charges that the *ad hoc* US policy toward Africa results from a complete failure to understand that some confusion and chaos is the African political norm. The US must develop an approach that accepts the occasional irrational appearance

of African politics if it is to develop any sort of long-range strategy.

Keith Somerville's Foreign Military Intervention in Africa is one of the few recent references. Somerville believes that the post-colonial legacies of political, social, and economic structures left Africa ill-equipped to cope with their internal problems. Initial weakness and internal security concerns led to requests for foreign assistance, which led to oppression of real or perceived opposition. Foreign intervention by one nation caused the dissident parties to seek aid from an alternate source. The local situation escalated into a regional one. The willingness of foreign powers to intervene led to ever-increasing dependence in politics and economics. Somerville concluded by asserting that Africa must remain responsible for any cure. It can no longer ask for aid and then condemn it as imperialistic when it arrives.

Many periodicals contained information and articles about Subsaharan Africa, national security strategy, and defense strategy. The American intervention in Somalia occurred while this thesis was in progress. Television news and newspapers carried the story, often on a daily or near-daily basis. Sources are cited where appropriate, though much information has entered the public domain. To maintain continuity, the majority of contemporary information about the American intervention in Somalia came from two primary

sources: The Washington Post National Weekly Edition and US News and World Report.

In summary, a review of the literature resulted in more information and from more viewpoints than originally anticipated. The one void is a treatment of the question of AIDS and its real and potential effect on the continent. Reports of contamination vary widely; no source is authoritative. AIDS is a relatively recent issue in the US. The majority of foreign policy references on Africa do not mention it. Isolated examination of the problem in Africa and the possible affect it could have on the social and political structure is not unexpected. However, adequate sources exist--in both book and periodical form--to allow an expanded inquiry into the issues of this thesis.

CHAPTER TWO

THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

The Evolution of the Unified Command Plan

There was not sufficient unity in command; there was a kind of stand off between the Army and the Navy when acting together which prevented them from working in harmony and with one purpose. There should always have been one man in an expedition in command of the whole, and his authority should have been so manifest that there would have been no appeal from his orders.¹

David Porter's comment in Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War shows that historically, the US Army and Navy operated independently of one another. Cooperation between them existed primarily on an ad hoc basis and only for the duration of whatever exercise or operation conducted. Though concerns about Army-Navy cooperation and unity of command had arisen as far back as the Civil War,² nothing was done.

In 1903, after the Spanish-American War and further Army-Navy coordination problems, the two military departments created the Joint Army-Navy Board. The Board handled all interservice issues until 1942, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was created. Though initially wary of a permanent, official organization made up of the heads of the respective services, President Franklin Roosevelt eventually

warmed to the idea. Soon, he grew comfortable with them and often summoned the new Joint Chiefs to his office to listen to his ideas on military strategy.³

World War II, with its many theaters of operations and its joint and combined operations and command structures proved the inferiority of the previous interservice relationship based solely and simply on mutual agreement, goodwill, and collaboration. The disaster of both Army and Navy forces in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, exposed the failures of the old system and the catastrophic effects of divided command.

After the war ended, the JCS decided to maintain some unified commands. The public and the Congress agreed, influenced heavily by the still painful memory of Pearl Harbor. Codified in the National Security Act of 1947, the JCS had a mandate to establish "unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security."⁴

The original concept of unified command assigned the JCS to act as executive agent for all unified commands. However, this arrangement proved inadequate.

In 1953, President Eisenhower directed the military departments act as executive agent rather than the JCS. Five years later, further changes occurred, some of which reversed the recently revised procedures. The most important revision eliminated the service secretaries from the

chain of command and ordered the operational commanders to report directly to the Secretary of Defense. Section 2 of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 proclaimed the national policy that

With the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish unified or specified combatant commands for the performance of military missions, and shall determine the force structure of such combatant commands to be composed of forces of the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, which shall then be assigned to such combatant commands by the departments concerned for the performance of such military missions. Such combat commands are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for such military missions as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President. Forces assigned to such unified combatant commands shall be under full operational command of the commander of the unified combatant command or the commander of the specified combatant command. All forces not so assigned remain for all purposes in their respective departments. Under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense each military department shall be responsible for the administration of the forces assigned from its department to such combatant commands. The responsibility for the support of forces assigned to combatant commands shall be vested in one or more of the military departments as may be directed by the Secretary of Defense. Forces assigned to such unified or specified combatant commands shall be transferred therefrom only by authority of and under procedures established by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President.⁵

Until modified by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, this provision remained the basis of the operational command structure.

The original operational commands evolved from those unified commands in place at the end of World War II (See Figure 2, Appendix). The first unified command was created

on July 14, 1945, the day Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force was dissolved. Originally called US Forces, European Theater, its name changed to US European Command (USEUCOM) on March 15, 1947. The other original unified and specified commands were:

- a. US Far East Command, established January 1, 1947.
- b. US Pacific Command, established January 1, 1947.
- c. US Alaskan Command, established January 1, 1947.
- d. US Atlantic Fleet Command, established November 1, 1947 (on December 1, 1947, the US Atlantic Command was established, thus superseding the US Atlantic Fleet Command).
- e. US Caribbean Command, established November 1, 1947.
- f. US Northeast Command, established October 1, 1950.
- g. US Strategic Air Command, established December 14, 1946 (though officially the first specified command, the term was not used until 1951).
- h. US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, established on November 1, 1946.⁶

During the years 1947-1986, several amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 were proposed and enacted. The most recent amendment, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, significantly streng-

thened the chain of command. It now runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the operational commands. In addition, all military forces are now assigned to unified or specified commands "except those assigned to carry out the mission of the Services, i.e., recruit, supply, equip, train, service, etc."

Current Organization and Responsibilities in Africa

Under the current UCP (See Figure 3, Appendix), four unified commands share responsibility for continental Africa and the off-shore island groups most often associated with Africa. The only operational command that does not share responsibility is US Southern Command, headquartered at Quarry Heights, Panama.

The majority of the continent falls under the responsibility of US European Command (USEUCOM), headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. In addition to commanding USEUCOM, Commander-in-Chief, US European Command (USCINCEUR) also serves as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Except for Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, all of continental Africa (41 nations) falls under USEUCOM for operational planning. In all, USEUCOM is responsible for 83 separate nations (including those which formerly comprised Yugoslavia).

The USEUCOM staff is thus responsible for creating and maintaining (if required) operational plans or contingency plans for many of the world's hotspots and flash-

points. Some of those are: Croatia-Bosnia-Serbia, all in the former Yugoslavia; Macedonia-Serbia, also in the former Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Liberia, Libya, South Africa, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Angola, and, Mozambique.

In addition, USEUCOM is responsible for the former Warsaw Pact nations, except Russia and its fellow members in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CJCS retains responsibility for that nation grouping.

Preparing operational plans and executing them in the remaining African nations is the responsibility of US Central Command (USCENTCOM), headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. USCENTCOM's slice of Africa is geography-based, and those African nations that comprise it hold strategic significance for the defense of the Persian Gulf and much of the world's oil reserves that exist there. In his January, 1980, State of the Union Address, President Jimmy Carter proclaimed America's strategic interest in the Persian Gulf when he declared that any "attempt by any outside force to gain control...will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States...."⁹ In addition to the oil fields themselves, much of the world's oil trade passes through strategic chokepoints that could be interdicted from continental Africa. These include the Suez Canal and the Bab el Mandeb, through which passes at least 10% of the oil used by Europe.⁹

The potential for disaster exists in USCENTCOM's slice of six African nations. First: Somalia, where legitimate government slipped into anarchy in January 1991 with the overthrow of Mohammed Siad Barre. Second: Sudan, where a civil war rages. Third: Ethiopia, which is recovering from the fall of the Mengistu Haile Mariam in May 1991. In addition, USCENTCOM's area of responsibility includes Pakistan but not India, an unfortunate division considering the historic animosity between those two nations. The crisis in the Southwest Asian subcontinent stretches the planning and intelligence resources of USCENTCOM even thinner. Finally, USCENTCOM maintains an enduring interest in the nations of the Persian Gulf itself.

In sum, though USCENTCOM is responsible for few individual African nations (compared to USEUCOM), they comprise some of the most unstable and dangerous countries and regions of the world.

The African island nations located in the Atlantic Ocean fall within the area of operations of US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM), headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia. These include Cape Verde, located off the northwest African coast and Sao Tome and Principe, located in the Gulf of Guinea. Fortunately for USLANTCOM, neither of these nations have significant problems. However, forces assigned under USLANTCOM and on patrol in the Atlantic Ocean can find themselves operating on the continent under the operational

control of USEUCOM. In 1990, US Marines performed a non-combatant evacuation (NEO) mission in Liberia. For the past two years, forces afloat in that area have been aware of their possible employment in that nation. American does not expect intervention in that nation. However, if the seven nation peacekeeping force provided by the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) finds itself in serious difficulty, USLANTCOM forces might intervene in Liberia again.

The fourth and final unified command to include African nations in its area of operations is US Pacific Command (USPACOM), headquartered at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii. USPACOM's area of responsibility is the largest of the five geographically oriented unified commands. USPACOM is responsible for Madagascar, Mauritius, Zanzibar, Reunion, the Seychelles, and the Comoros, all of which are located in the Indian Ocean. Like the nations located within USLANTCOM's area of operations, these countries currently have few problems that may require planned intervention. However, most of the island nations operated within the Soviet orbit, especially Madagascar. Despite efforts to increase interest and a tourism industry, many of these nations are poor and dependent on their nearby continental friends and former colonial powers.

Both the USLANTCOM and USPACOM boundaries are defined by longitude. As a result, the body of water off the

Cape of Good Hope and the western (Atlantic) coast of South Africa is assigned to USPACOM. US warships operating in this area fall under the operational control of USPACOM, located several thousand miles away in Hawaii.

The four functional based unified commands, US Space Command (USSPACECOM), US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and the one specified command, US Forces Command (USFORSCOM), normally contribute their forces in support of the geographic based unified commander in a crisis.

The active Army service component of USSOCOM contains some units oriented geographically on Subsaharan Africa: the 3rd Special Forces Group, and one company of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, both located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. These units conduct training exercises and regularly disperse military training teams to the continent on a regular basis. However, the Department of Defense operates no permanent installations on the African continent. When deployed to Africa, these forces report through the Special Forces element of USEUCOM.

Military Strategy in the Post-Cold War World

Until World War II, the United States was a decidedly isolationist nation. US involvement in World War I had been important, perhaps even decisive, but after flirting with occupation duty and a largely inconsequential military

expedition to fight Bolsheviks in Siberia, America restricted her military muscle-flexing to its colonies, territories, and small force interventions against rebels and insurgents in the Caribbean. The US preferred domestic affairs and maintained subtle military and foreign policies. The international balance of power provoked little interest.

In 1945, only the US had the power to thwart the expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union. Two years later, President Truman sent a message to Congress proposing aid for Greece and Turkey in their struggle against Communist insurgents and "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."¹⁰ With the Truman Doctrine, the US reached maturity and began its enduring role as a world leader and interventionist power.

With the publication of NSC Paper 68, America grew more bold, intervening regularly and frequently, not because of a desire to meddle in the internal affairs of other nations but to provide a response to the imperialistic pressures and ambitions of the Soviet Union. Usually, the US refrained from involving allies during its interventions. Preferring a unilateral approach, it rarely failed to solicit either the tacit support or open encouragement of allies. Once the intervention had succeeded or appeared secure, the US welcomed other allies and organizations' involvement.

The Korean War, Vietnam, Dominican Republic, and Grenada are examples of this policy.

In addition to adopting an interventionist philosophy during the Truman Administration, the US pursued several multilateral and bilateral defense treaties still in force today.¹¹ The absence of a Communist threat provokes questions about the usefulness of a wide-ranging multilateral series of defense treaties and alliances. These treaties may have outlived their usefulness.

America's operational commands have to contend with a large number of trouble spots in the world. Despite the Somalia intervention in Somalia and the potential for more interventions, Americans are more concerned with international economic competition, AIDS, global warming, and pollution control.¹² The commanders and planners of the operational commands have similar concerns, but theirs are colored by the necessity to consider military operations according to the emerging geo-political structure. These commanders and planners focus on developing trends and inclinations and rising power centers.

Some of the developing--both positive and negative--trends of the Post-Cold War world are:

- a. Emerging democratic governments in former one-party or Marxist, totalitarian states.

b. The increased likelihood of civil war in countries where the dormancy of ethnic and nationalist-based rivalries, some hundreds of years old, is over.

c. The growth of the global economy and increased economic interdependence.

d. A rise in domestic and foreign economic protectionism and isolationism.

e. An ever-increasing rate at which technology develops and can be applied for human benefit.

f. Unchecked or ignored proliferation of weapons systems, especially in countries that can barely feed themselves.

g. Increased interest and attitudes in the environment.¹³

In addition, the power centers have shifted since the end of the Cold War. The absence of the Soviet Union increases the impact and influence of regional powers. The US remains a very powerful nation, despite domestic boasting about how it lags behind another nation in this or that area. Other power centers that assumed a greater leadership role in the vacuum caused by the departure of the USSR are Japan, the nations that comprise the European Economic Community (the Common Market), and the Persian Gulf. Other emerging power centers are the Islamic nations, Korea, China, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, India, Pakistan, and Egypt.

Though Islam embraces several different sects often depicted as inimical toward one another, it is nevertheless true that many in the world are practitioners. The religion represents a very important source of their ethnic and national identities, though not without its cracks and ruptures. But for these flaws, Islam could be counted as one of the major power centers with the US, the EEC, and Japan.

In the short period since the end of the Cold War, the US has had a difficult time determining what its role in the world should become. The old, anti-communist function has lost its significance. When President Bush announced his new strategy during his Aspen speech,¹⁴ he used the term "peacetime engagement." That term soon lost its meaning when the US intervened in the Persian Gulf. During his State of the Union Address delivered January 28, 1992, he proclaimed a global leadership role for the nation:

There are those who say that now we can turn away from the world, that we have no special role, no special place. But we are the United States of America, the leader of the West that has become the leader of the world. As long as I am President, we will continue to lead in support of freedom everywhere, not out of arrogance and not out of altruism, but for the safety and security of our children.¹⁵

In his National Strategy pamphlet as well as in numerous speeches, President Bush outlined his goal of a new world order. He envisioned changes the world should take, not what it had experienced.

A new world order is not a fact, it is an aspiration--and an opportunity. We have within our grasp an extraordinary possibility that few generations have enjoyed--to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals, as old patterns and certainties crumble around us.¹⁶

The National Security Strategy included illustrations of the economic, political, and military elements of global leadership. It stated a desire to pursue policies that would increase and intensify world markets, and to strive to maintain alliances and friendships with allies. Militarily, the strategy outlined included those four pillars mentioned in Chapter One: Strategic Deterrence, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution.

The term strategic deterrence applies directly to deterring or reducing the threat of nuclear attack on the US. Though the Soviet Union has disappeared, its intercontinental ballistic missiles have not. As unlikely as a premeditated attack from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or China might be, the potential range of nuclear-armed attackers is expanding. The possibilities include: accidental or unauthorized attack as a result of civil war or breach of security; international extortion on the part of a rogue nation or terrorist group that obtains a nuclear device or develops the technology to build one; and, proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems to an increasingly large number of nations, including those with major political, cultural, and ethnic difficulties with their neighbors.

The famous clock on the cover of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists now shows 17 minutes to midnight (its most optimistic location ever). However, the threat of nuclear confrontation still spreads like a stain across much of the world and is important enough to remain at the very top of the US' defense priorities. South Africa possesses a nuclear capability, and it is only a matter of time before other African nations buy or develop the technology as well. Nigeria, one of the wealthier nations because of its oil deposits, is one country whose strong influence in the region could easily be overcome by a disgruntled or jealous neighbor armed with a nuclear device. Nigerians could also develop one themselves. Regardless, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and chemical weapons is more likely than ever to threaten soldiers on any future battlefield.

Achieving the second of the four strategic imperatives, forward presence, is more difficult today than in the past. The disappearance of the Soviet threat and its military expansion has left many wondering why the US should continue to maintain bases abroad. Correspondingly, the US presence in Europe is in the process of a 60 to 75% reduction from what it was only two years ago. US presence in Korea will be reduced significantly (though it remains on hold while North Korea is investigated for possession of a nuclear weapon), and US basing presence in Panama will end by the turn of the century. However, forward presence is

not just forward basing. Special Forces and civil affairs training teams, engineers, and other units with nation-building skills help maintain a forward presence. In addition, the military attaches and security assistance officers assigned to embassies and military assistance groups throughout the region provide a small but permanent US military presence.

With fewer forces stationed abroad and major budget cutbacks, the task of maintaining a credible forward presence will fall increasingly on naval forces, requiring longer deployments and a correspondingly greater strain on ships, possibly shortening their service life. Already, though the Navy Base Force (the minimum necessary to conduct its Post-Cold War missions) requires a 450 ship fleet, shipbuilding rates have slackened to a new low level, capable of sustaining only 300.¹⁷ Other issues plague the Navy in its quest to build a force structure equipped to meet the needs of a regional conflict.

During the Cold War, US defense priorities centered on maintaining strategic nuclear deterrence, then NATO, then Korea and Southwest Asia. Having acquired large, well-equipped forces leads many planners to assume that if the US could handle these crises, then it could handle any of a number of lesser perils. Our preparation for these crises led the US to develop large standing forces and large num-

bers of troops stationed abroad, all without a stated strategy of crisis response.

This paradigm of the Cold War has lost its applicability, but the threat of an unexpected or ill-prepared-for crisis represents the greatest of the four defense priorities. The sheer number and diversity of regions in crisis or operating in its shadow restricts the amount of planning the US can afford to conduct for those regions. As a result, some plans--like those for US intervention in the Persian Gulf--remain at the forefront of military planning efforts, while those for intervention on the African continent receive little attention until needed. However, as President Bush has stated repeatedly, the US is not to function as the "world's policeman"--though few would argue that no other nation possesses the military skill, budget, and capability to conduct the entire range of military options as efficiently. The US has a dilemma; what categories and tiers of crisis would warrant a response or intervention?

With crisis response as one of the four pillars of its military strategy, the need for a flexible US military force structure increases dramatically, especially those in the active force. This assumes that a quick response is both necessary and desirable. Some political considerations may warrant a less robust reaction to allow potential adversaries time to reconsider the full implication of their

actions. Reserve forces generally cannot respond as quickly as active units, regardless of training level. This is particularly true of Army National Guard or Army Reserve maneuver units, which may require a train up period of many months before they are considered combat ready. The greater the expectation of crisis, the greater the argument for larger active forces and large force structures abroad. The US reversed its position on forward presence and crisis response. Current strategy is supported by fewer forces and the lowest overseas presence since the end of World War II.

The final pillar of US defense strategy is Reconstitution. Based on the assumption that the US will one day face an adversary similar in size and depth of forces to that of the Soviet Union, the President intended to demonstrate that military reserve forces were viable. If necessary, the US could quickly expand its force to Cold War levels. The concept, intended for the long range, has almost no applicability in the near term. Thus, it competes for resourcing against more immediate demands, and results in funding at reduced levels, if at all.

As the US emerges from its strategy of balance of power with the Soviets and assumes the role of global leader, its military strategy should reflect its accompanying commitment. Overall, global leadership demands greater reliance on economic and political leadership than military leadership. The decline in American military power is in

itself a reflection of a major international trend toward smaller military forces. The US must not move recklessly as it finds a comfortable balance for the next century.

Role of the United Nations

The United Nations is becoming an even more important player in the geopolitics of the Post-Cold War world. Its peacekeeping missions have expanded greatly since the demise of the Soviet Union, and are likely to expand even more during the next decade. Though obviously not subordinate to the US or the UCP, the United Nations will become increasingly important in determining where America's military forces next face confrontation. For that reason--the increasing role of the UN in military and paramilitary operations--discussion of that role is appropriate. Just before he left office, President Bush acknowledged and publicly committed the US to support the re-emerging role of the United Nations:

With the paralyzing divisions of the Cold War now over, the United Nations has been given a new lease on life, emerging as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and the preservation of peace. But the requirement for U.N. action has increased dramatically and now includes everything from election monitoring, preventive diplomacy and traditional peacekeeping to humanitarian relief, facilitating the stable transition of previously belligerent states back into the community of Nations, and monitoring compliance with Security Council resolutions. The UN has undertaken fifteen new operations in the last four years alone, from Angola, El Salvador, the Western Sahara, Cambodia, and Yugoslavia, to Iraq/Kuwait, Somalia, Mozambique, and Afghanistan.

In concert with others, the United States must renew its efforts to improve the recent effectiveness of the United Nations. As was demonstrated in the Gulf War and in subsequent crises, we now have the opportunity to make the United Nations a key instrument of collective security. The United States should do its part to strengthen UN conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking capabilities.¹⁸

The role of the United Nations (UN) in operational military command as well as in Subsaharan Africa is extremely complex. Established at the end of World War II, the United Nations is "chief among the multilateral institutions dedicated to strengthening international security...to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."¹⁹

Since its origin, the UN resorted to peacekeeping in many locations, including the formation of seven separate forces in the past two years (in Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM), Angola (UNAVEM II), El Salvador (ONUSAL), Western Sahara (MINURSO), Cambodia (UNTAC), Croatia-Serbia (UNPROFOR), and Somalia (UNOSOM)). Other, non-UN peacekeeping forces have deployed to various nations and regions around the world since 1945, with varying degrees of success. Among them are the Multinational Force in Lebanon (1982-1984), the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (1980-present), and the Economic Organization of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia (1990-present). In the period 1945-1987, 13 UN peacekeeping operations were placed in operation. During the past four years alone, 13 more were created. Peacekeeping for the UN has become a growth industry.

As the military capabilities of smaller nations have increased so has their distaste for multinational intervention in their regions by the US or other large western powers, hence the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia.

Despite its attempts to assert itself as the only global forum dedicated to preserving world peace and international security, the UN faces two overwhelming problems. First, paralysis caused by a crippling lack of consensus, especially within the Security Council. Second, inflated budgets caused by hopeless financial mismanagement and corruption.

The paralysis of the Security Council derives from a lack of foresight on the part of the founders of the UN. Those founders anticipated that the major powers that made up the Security Council had an overriding interest in collective security that they would apply their power to resolve conflicts even where their interests were not directly involved. Nor did the founders anticipate the surrogate role nations of the Third World would play in the Cold War.

It is important to note that peacekeeping efforts--sanctioned by the UN or otherwise--are not designed to solve the underlying dispute that resulted in violence so severe as to require a multinational intervention. Rather, peacekeepers exist as buffers between the warring factions, preventing hostile groups from resuming their fighting. The actual political negotiations that restore order are the

responsibility of the opposing factions, which may meet in UN controlled neutral territory.

Despite their presence, however, peacekeepers are still responsible to the UN for guidance and authority. In some cases, the UN passes resolutions without providing its peacekeepers the latitude to enforce their provisions. Another criticism of the UN peacekeeping efforts is that the UN rarely looks beyond the short-term goals of imposing a ceasefire. Thus, the UN establishes a peacekeeping force without a clear end-state or plan to withdraw its peacekeeping forces. As an example, the UN established a peacekeeping force to monitor the Arab-Israeli armistice of 1948. That force still exists, numbering approximately 300 personnel and costing over \$31 million annually, despite three major wars in the region between the very nations who signed the armistice.²⁰ Not counting the forces deployed to Somalia, the UN maintains 47,000 peacekeepers stationed throughout the world at an estimated cost of \$424 million. Not included in these costs are those spent in Cambodia, which are not available but are estimated to run nearly \$1.7 billion.²¹

The swelling budget of peacekeeping adds to an already significant crisis within the UN fiscal management structure. Reforms are long overdue. The US is assessed 25% of the total UN budget and 30.4% of the costs assessed to support peacekeeping forces. This is double that of the

next-largest single contributor, Japan. The US still finds itself and its proposals regularly outvoted by nations that contribute only the minimum assessment of 1/100th of one percent. In addition to its 1991-1992 biennial assessment, the US owes \$1.75 billion. The money was withheld by the US government to protest what it viewed were unnecessary and wasteful projects. An example of such waste is the proposed \$200 million conference center, to be built in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, a nation on the brink of starvation and disaster similar to that of Somalia.²²

Making the system worse is the lack of any centralized control over the allocation of budget monies. Though nations are often resistant to contributing forces to peacekeeping roles in faraway countries, the forces often live well, since the budget allocates \$227.5 million for per diem alone.²³

Given its political and budget problems, the role of the UN as guarantor of world peace needs re-assessment. Its bloated, self-serving management style is ill-suited to serve as the headquarters of a confederacy where the parts are greater than the whole (See Figure 4, Appendix). Its ability to empower its peacekeeping forces needs strengthening, and it needs an independent budgeting and auditing agency. The first solution is unlikely, the second is long overdue, but also unlikely, at least in the near term. The troubles within the UN will increase the desires of many

nations to act unilaterally, especially within their regional areas. Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly vulnerable to this possibility, given its relative isolation from the west, its large arsenals--provided courtesy of the Cold War--and the potential for conflict.

The US is not the answer to the UN's problems. US policy--forward presence and crisis response notwithstanding--is to allow the UN a chance to act first. The US is usually reluctant to act, and when it does, it prefers to act multilaterally. US intervention in Somalia on behalf of the UN is an unusual step, and despite all assurances to the contrary, the Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali requested US forces to expand their humanitarian assistance role to one of active peacemaking only days after they landed. Such a request is both understandable and unfortunate, for it demonstrates the lack of confidence the Secretary-General has in non-US forces to create a peaceful political situation. Obviously, Boutros-Ghali knew the UN could scarcely conduct the operations currently sanctioned and could ill afford to take on more, especially one as intricate and dangerous as Somalia.

CHAPTER THREE

SUBSAHARAN AFRICA

US Interests

From the end of colonialization in the early 1960's to the present, US interests in subsaharan Africa have occupied a very low position on the list of strategic priorities. Several reasons for this exist, not the least of which is the influence still held in the region by the former European colonial powers. The US generally supported these colonial powers through NATO, but not always.¹

As the activity in the Cold War increased during the 1970's and throughout the 1980's, the US tried to exert more influence through arms sales, soliciting African nations away from those offered by the Soviet Union. Many assumed the reason for US interest to be caches of strategic minerals believed buried under the African jungle and desert landscapes. Others saw the increased interest as one of ideology, while still others saw the US interests as imperialistic and exploitative, both of the environment and of the people.

Official representatives to Subsaharan Africa often harmed the US credibility there. During the Reagan administration, the continent was treated as a sleepy backwater.

Most ambassadors were wealthy political appointees who knew little and cared less about the politics, the culture, or the opportunities for improving American-African relations.²

The US has seen some limited foreign policy success, especially in South Africa and Angola. However, the long-range US plan for the continent has been near-sighted and elementary. Unfortunately, the trend is continuing. The Somali government disintegrated into anarchy nearly two years ago. Extreme drought aggravated the situation into a catastrophe of immense proportion, yet the US only acknowledged its humanitarian interest and volunteered its immense power to help after being subjected to an unprecedented barrage of videotape portraying thousands of starving Somali people. The circumstances surrounding US intervention are depressing and ominous. The richest, most powerful nation on earth shamed into action and acceptance of its national interest in human rights by the media.

The media encouraged intervention by the US government through its coverage of the Somalia tragedy and must be careful to avoid allowing itself to be painted into such a corner again.

The US has five categories of national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa: economic, political, military, humanitarian, and pragmatic.

Economically, US interests center on but are not limited to the strategic mineral reserves in South Africa, Zaire, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere and the oil deposits in Nigeria. All of Subsaharan Africa--not just South Africa--contains other natural resources as well as markets for all manner of US manufactured goods and industry. Stability in the region depends on a stable economy.

In South Africa in particular, the nation's wealth depends heavily on the export of precious and strategic minerals. Gold and gem-quality diamonds do not count as strategic, though gold is important to the maintenance of the world's monetary system. Of the 27 minerals classified as critical to industry by the US Geological Survey, four are produced in by South Africa in important quantities: chromium, manganese, vanadium, and platinum group metals.³ Significantly, the only other major source for most of these metals is Russia.

Overall US imports of these minerals account for over 90% of what is consumed. Outside the former Soviet bloc, where political upheaval has limited mining and export of minerals, South Africa produces 43% of the world's chromium, 37% of its manganese, 52% of its vanadium, and 87% of its platinum group.

The political unpredictability of the former Soviet Union increases US reliance on South African-produced strategic minerals for at least the short term. However, South

Africa itself is a tense, increasingly unstable and unpredictable political power. If both Russian and South African mineral sources cease production for political reasons or agree to increase prices drastically, economic and industrial disaster could result. America must either work to ensure an uninterrupted flow of these minerals or develop alternate energy sources, enhance recycling efforts, develop synthetics, and improve technology to improve US ability to stretch its consumptive rates for the long term.

Politically, the US interest is ideological; advancing the cause of freedom or democracy. With some fifty nations on the continent and island-nations, Africa merits attention. Africa has a sad history of one-party states, military dictatorships, and the bloody tradition of changing governments by coup d'etats. Improvement in the political structure of the continent is a victory of democratic ideology. On a practical note, the Africans represent a large (over 25%) voting bloc in the United Nations. Though the problems of the UN are apparent, the US emphasis on overall support for the world body increases its prestige abroad. It may also improve its abilities to accomplish objectives by working through other member nations.

Militarily, Sub-Saharan Africa is low priority, even during the US intervention on the eastern coast in Somalia. If much of the continent found itself under the control or influence of anti-US nations or groups, aircraft might be

denied overflight rights* and ports might be closed to Navy and merchant ships, thus denying the US a presence in the region. Such a situation could inhibit but not significantly limit the US ability to defend other parts of the world, most notably the Persian Gulf.

The Horn of Africa (consisting primarily of Somalia, Djibouti, and Ethiopia), is a strategically important region from which the US and its allies--or its enemies can interdict and influence policy in the Persian Gulf. The region controls southern access to the Suez Canal through the Bab el Mandeb, and thus can close the canal or restrict it to local traffic. In addition, the area offers airstrips close to the Arabian Peninsula. The US acknowledges the strategic value of the Horn and includes it in the operational area of responsibility assigned to the US Central Command.

At a glance, the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa seems to have lost much of its strategic influence. Though thousands of ships pass by the cape each month, many carrying oil bound for the west, the radial distance of this maritime chokepoint is over 1,000 miles. Soviet submarines and other naval vessels rarely patrolled there, leaving the wild Southern Ocean for less debilitating ports of call. However, the proximity of South Africa to Antarctica and its untapped resources validates its strategic significance.

The Washington Treaty of 1961 freezes many overlapping international claims to the Antarctic continent and

control over part of Britain's claim was one of the reasons the United Kingdom and Argentina fought in the Falklands. In recent years, several nations have attempted to assert themselves in antarctic waters and on the continent. These include the emerging powers of Brazil, India, Germany, China, and Peru. Though rarely mentioned in national strategic policy formulation, the presence of an abundance of natural resources (including an estimated 45 billion barrels of oil and 3.3 trillion cubic meters of gas) in Antarctica and its relative isolation from the major political powers increases the importance of South Africa as a place from which to project power should the need arise.⁵

For many, humanitarian concerns are the most compelling national interest in Subsaharan Africa. The situation in Somalia is a disaster of extraordinary proportion, but unfortunately, most of Subsaharan Africa faces the similar situation of extreme drought on an increasingly frequent basis. All of the world's major religions and all but the most insensitive political philosophies agree that an obligation of the rich is to help feed the poor. On a more practical level, 500 million hungry, desperate people are a destabilizing factor that affect the world's international affairs.

Finally, the overwhelming national interest in Subsaharan Africa is one of pragmatism. This type of national interest is both a subset of those listed above and one that

is difficult to define. If the US acknowledges any humanitarian, political, strategic or economic interests in Africa at all, then that definable interest also becomes a practical interest. For example, if the US acknowledges a humanitarian interest in Somalia, then out of practicality, it should recognize other humanitarian interests in other drought-stricken, politically unstable nations. A failure to anticipate such a situation or to develop a criteria for intervention in such a situation aggravates world opinion and is counter-productive. As the above examples indicate, the US does indeed have long-term national interests in Subsaharan Africa. However, expectations of either consistency or predictive criteria are always wanted and are always unrealistic. Otherwise, all of this would be simpler.

Given both the positive and negative aspects, a hands-on policy, enhancing US prestige and power in the region, stands to gain far more than it might lose. The US has placed Africa at the bottom of its priority list for decades, pursuing a policy of enforced indifference while assuming that the former colonial powers would assert themselves when intervention or guidance was necessary. Many of those countries are themselves suffering economic or political crises and cannot afford to turn away from domestic concerns to those of their former colonies.

US Policies and Objectives

As Subsaharan Africa has matured, it has developed increasingly complex zones, arcs, regions and districts of overlapping interests for US foreign policy.

Since the end of colonialization, American policy-makers have found it very difficult to develop US policies in subsaharan Africa. First, there is the diversity of the continent itself, which prohibits all but the most general categorization. Africa includes Egypt, the Arab keystone to international ambitions to achieve peace in the Middle East, as well as its neighbor Libya. As a proponent of state-sponsored terrorism of the most venal description, Libya requires constant monitoring. Africa also includes the strategically prominent Horn and the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. The west coast of Africa contains many small nations and many diverse ethnic and tribal groups within those nations.

Until colonialization ended in 1960, US presidents and their subordinates paid scant attention to Subsaharan Africa. Overall, they preferred to see any problems or issues as the domestic concerns of European allies and thus not the concern of the US. Indifference and benign neglect dominated US attitudes, even towards embryonic independence movements desperate for a democratic role model.

The Kennedy administration reversed this policy, ushering in a new American idealism of hands-on development

and open dialogue between the US and the emerging subsaharan African nations.⁶ Establishment of the Peace Corps and a near-doubling of economic aid (from \$139 million in 1960 to \$250 million in 1961 and 1962).⁷

During the Johnson administration, foreign policy priorities shifted dramatically. First, the administration was seriously committed to containing the spread of communism. Though opportunities existed to support an anti-communist factions through a proactive foreign policy, more pressing issues took precedence. Congress supported Johnson's anti-communist priorities and cut aid to Africa drastically. By 1965, aid had dropped back to \$164 million.⁸ Objectively, Johnson's foreign policy was formed by the Vietnam War. Any objective evaluation of his administration's attitudes or priorities toward Africa is colored by the overwhelming priority of the conduct of that war.

However, the Johnson administrations did not limit its support for African nations to simple aid packages. In 1964, the administration supported Belgian paratroop assaults on Stanleyville and Paulis, Congo, where Simba rebels held 1,600 European residents hostage. By providing airlift and CIA pilots for bombing support, the US intervened in Africa in a large yet largely unpublicized way.⁹

The Nixon administration also lost opportunities in Africa because of Vietnam. Nixon supported the right of all Africans to self-determination, including that of the white

South Africans and Rhodesians. Southern Africa and the mineral deposits shaped most of US Subsaharan African policy during this era. However, the US did begin its long sponsorship of pro-Western forces in Angola, though the country remained a Portuguese colony until 1974. The relatively brief Ford administration continued to carry out the Africa policies of the Nixon administration.

The Carter administration saw Africa as predominantly a one issue (black-white confrontation in South Africa) continent confined to one region and developed its policy within this one dimension.¹⁰ Practically, encouraging the end of apartheid provided the means to counter growing Soviet interest on the continent, but that goal was not communicated effectively, and several African nations resented such a patronizing, simplistic, approach. These included Nigeria and Kenya, arguably two of the most stable, pro-Western nations in Subsaharan Africa. The Carter administration failed to realize the traditional American ideals and moral concern for the human rights of black South Africans--while repugnant and out-of-step with progressive western nations--could not and should not determine the depth of interest in the continent. American policy often contains a healthy dose of idealism and naivete, but it must blend with and balance more tangible interests.

US policy toward Africa today has remained largely unchanged since the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1981,

despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat. The policy keys on South Africa. It recognizes the revulsion of South African apartheid but also other well-documented human rights abuses (genocide, slavery, torture, etc.) on the continent. It encourages South African adoption of one-man, one-vote democracy, but at a pace that retains some vestiges of stability and lessens the economic impact on the country and the world.

South African dominance in current policy is understandable given that nation's racial policies and US sensitivity to civil rights issues. Traditional white South African opposition to communism provided a bulkhead against its spread of that ideology and provided a place from which to project power into the interior of the continent should the need have arisen.

The Reagan administration took a proactive stance in southern African at the expense of more northern nations. Acting on the assumption that South Africa would move more toward democracy with encouragement and evidence of trust, US policymakers established a new relationship. Over the past 12 years, South Africa has taken many steps to resolve its political situation without falling into chaos. Free and open elections were proposed for January 1994, and the official apartheid policy will likely end, since black majority rule is a virtual certainty. One of the transitional agreements worked out between de Klerk and Nelson

Mandela, leader of the black African National Congress, is to maintain a bipartisan control of economic policy and economic structures. Both men are aware and fear South Africa descending into an abyss of economic chaos during the exchange of power. It is reasonable to assume that despite their mutual animosity, they desire a peaceful transition that will cause the least amount of economic hardship and will not require changes to the UCP.

Post-Cold War African Geopolitics

Overall, Africa's transition through decolonization has been a painful. The diversity of the continent, reflected in the wide range of ethnic groups (black, white, Arab, Indian) and the dissimilar colonial experiences ensure that the continent shall never speak as one people. Political boundaries, drawn long ago by colonialists without regard for ethnic preferences or realities, have been accepted for lack of any real, workable alternative. The boundaries form much of what is permanent in African politics and accepting them as they are is the prime directive of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Throughout its post-colonial history, most African nations proclaimed themselves non-aligned, primarily to realize complete freedom from its colonial past including political, economic, and social autonomy in addition to independence. However, declaring freedom and achieving it are but loosely related. African nations were not then and

are not now either economically or politically self-sufficient. The continent is dependent on charity for food and other assistance and will be for many more years.

However, since it is no longer a proving ground for East-West confrontation, subsaharan Africa is entering a new era, one of unanticipated sovereignty. Though it is difficult to generalize, several geopolitical trends have emerged in recent years.

The continent's original statesmen, the politicians that squeezed independence from the colonial powers, are growing old and complacent. Content with what the accomplished vis-a-vis what they started with, many counsel their proteges to continue the same pattern of development that brought them out of the 19th century only 32 years ago. The younger leaders, want to move quickly and focus their long-range goals on those things that not only will improve Africa but can be completed during their lifetime. Their expectations continue to rise, and, having little or no frame of reference equivalent to that of their elders, they see no reason to compromise and lower them.¹¹ Unfortunately, the younger generation is prone to violence, as recent bloody revolutions in Angola, Liberia, and Ghana illustrate.

Some might argue that the policies of the US has matured, thanks to its successful (thus far) strategy toward South Africa and the encouragement to eliminate apartheid. However, recent American forays into Liberia and Somalia to

perform both non-combatant evacuation operations and humanitarian relief demonstrates that the US has become preoccupied with other issues, leaving South Africa without a patron. In addition, despite acknowledgement of Africa's economic problems, the US has taken little action to help overcome them.

The Subsaharan African economies have been in a crisis for so long that it seems impossible that any of the nations can remain solvent. Shortly after independence, the new governments had to explain shortfalls in expected and official proclaimed economic progress. Politicians found it difficult to admit their errors and thus undermine what credibility they had, so scapegoats were needed. Foreigners and foreign corporations made attractive and convenient targets. Such xenophobia seriously harmed economic progress just at the beginning, when growth and development were so vital to each new nation. Thanks to the former imperial powers and their sense of moral responsibility, Africa has been able to maintain some modicum of financial management. Unfortunately, these countries have begun to feel the pinch in recent years as the will and the means to assist has eroded. Soon the erosion will allow African nations to experience freedom from the burden of dependency, which has sheltered them for so long.¹²

Neither the young nor the old African leadership seems to understand that their economic problems are in

large part their own doing. When asked why African development has lagged so far behind that of East Asia (a region that also suffered an inauspicious economic beginning to independence), Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni said: "The discipline of the Asians compared to Africans."¹³

If colonialists were guilty of injustice, corruption, and underpaying their workers, then the African leaders are as well. Tribalism and ethnicism continue uncontrolled and are often the first and only important criteria for jobs or political influence. Blood ties are what count, not nationalistic ties. Patriotism and desire to perform work for the public good is secondary to attaining what is perceived as a birthright.¹⁴

Those nations who lack strategic resources feel the neglect even more strongly. Despite their greater need, they have little to offer in return except the promise that they will need more and more aid in the future. The neglected nations resent their more fortunate neighbors, which adds to the destabilizing effects of the poor economy. Regrettably, Africa is and has always been a welfare continent, dependent on the charity of other, richer nations to feed it, clothe it, and defend it from exterior and interior attack. Unless the inhabitants can develop a true sense of community within the many national borders, the continent is doomed to repeat the same vicious cycle.

Finally, it appears that nature has plotted with the gods of economic fortune to prevent defeat from ever getting close to the jaws of victory. Even with all the corruption, complacency, and willingness on the part of the people to pursue black market riches rather than place their goods in state-controlled markets, the devastating droughts and diseases that sweep across the continent aggravate the situation almost beyond comprehension. "Bad environment" exacerbates the "bad luck, bad policy, bad government, bad faith (by western powers), and bad outlook," combination that defines the African economic disaster.¹⁵

The New Realities: Regional/Ethnic Powers

As the leaders of the nations of Subsaharan Africa confront their problems, realize that their superpower patrons have largely abandoned them, and struggle with the crushing economic, political, and social problems they inherited from earlier regime, they learn and accept the new realities and standards for international behavior. First, innocence and ignorance are no longer excuses for solutions to problems that prove unacceptable either to the nation or the world at large. Many African nations have discovered the western habit of ignoring a problem, since the cost of solving it may prove more costly than evading it.

Romantic notions of a confederated government of Africa through the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has largely disappeared. A noble experiment, the OAU has fallen

victim to its own diversity and bureaucratic rules, which depend on the good faith of all members. As a result, subregional powers like the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) have formed to act where the OAU could not build a consensus.

These organizations are not the old organizations endowed by the colonial powers as they granted independence. Those organizations, like the East Africa Economic Community have faded into obscurity or been disbanded. Subsaharan African nations must band together to overcome their linguistic and ideological differences if they are to survive. Only then will come public acknowledgement of subregional superpowers, like Nigeria, Zaire, and South Africa.

Nigeria is dominant in west Africa. Buoyed by oil reserves and a comparatively stable government, Nigeria possesses the natural resources to keep her economy running for many years. Nigeria's exports and gross national product have slipped dramatically during the past ten years. However, the decline is due as much to deflated oil prices as well as a failure to diversify foreign investment. In 1990, Nigeria exported nearly \$20 billion dollars worth of oil, accounting for nearly 60% of its gross national product.¹⁶

Nigeria faces both economic and political competition from the skewed and dangerous government of Libya, which has imperialist tendencies and is a major destabilizing force in Africa. Because the Nigerian economy is tied

so closely to the price of oil, the nation suffers when the price is low. To help consolidate its status as a leader in the subregion, Nigeria provided major support for ECOWAS, volunteering its capital, Lagos, as one of the administrative centers of the organization. Finally, because the Nigerians are a strong and generally stabilizing force, they are feared by their weaker neighbors. Nigeria supplies most of the petroleum products to its neighbors, and does not hesitate to use oil as a trump card in order to extort support for its policies.

In southern Africa, the Southern African Development and Coordination Council (SADCC) is comprised of several countries, including Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana. Formed to counter Republic of South Africa (RSA) attempts at hegemony in the area, the SADCC has assumed the leadership of the nations not directly within the RSA orbit. Its charter is multilateral aid for infrastructure for its member nations. With infrastructure comes better and freer trade, more economic interdependence, and more prosperity. Members of the organization, facing their own series of droughts and environmental hardships, earnestly desire membership for the RSA, but not under current political conditions.

In east Africa, from the Horn to Mozambique, chaos continues unchecked. Once thought as an ideal vehicle for economic union, the anglophone nations of east Africa banded

together at the urging of their former colonial masters and formed the East Africa Economic Union. The organization no longer exists, having been dissolved in fits of violence that occurred in Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania during the 1960's and 1970's.

Ethiopia, though not currently drought-stricken, is one of the poorest nations on earth, with scarce natural resources. Few countries that show any interest in investment. In large part, the nation is just awakening from its long nightmare under the leader Mengistu, and will take long years to recover even to point of pre-Mengistu poverty levels.

Somalia is a sad story and is currently the focal point of much international attention and aid. It will be dealt with in greater depth in a later chapter.

Kenya, the most stable nation in East Africa, recently ran afoul of the Bush administration for human rights abuses and increasingly totalitarian leanings.

The nations of east Africa carry the triple burden of strategic importance, few natural resources (except the accidents of geography that place the Persian Gulf within interdiction range) and the legacy of superpower interest caused by the geography. Several major wars have been fought in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia since independence, largely a result of tribalism and ethnic groups that do not recognize artificial boundaries. Battling ideologies used

the subregion as a battleground for many years. Unfortunately, the rent is now due.

Future challenges for these subregions of Africa are so numerous and so desperately needed that it is difficult to know where to begin. In addition to overwhelming economic reform, regardless of political structure, the following challenges compete for top priority:

1. Confront the ethnic-tribal issues. Africa is a tribal, clannish region. Americans and other non-Africans who assume cultural unity because of nationality or skin color aggravate the situation through their ignorance. Artificial borders stop only those people who understand what the imaginary lines mean. People whose ethnic homeland spreads across two or more of these boundaries will not be denied to travel across them at will. Also, despite efforts to educate the elite at prestigious universities abroad, Africa needs trained professionals of every discipline. Education takes time, and as Africans realize that "growing their own" experts simply aggravates the problem, they will swallow some of their pride and hire outsiders.

2. Africa must grant its military a productive role within government while simultaneously expanding the control of the central government. Military coups are a potential form of political change in nearly every country in Africa. Both officer and enlisted ranks contain charismatic leaders that are capable of quick, decisive, bloody action. Al-

though many African nations have conducted wars, either with other nations or in counterinsurgencies, the military is often both powerful and bored. Since reducing the power is unlikely, harnessing that power to act as honest broker in political contests could provide a solution. Political breakdowns are occurring with disturbing regularity. If Somalia is any indication of what happens when government disintegrates, then a careful eye must be kept on the regimes that demonstrate a withdraw from outerlying territories and abandon them to their own autonomy.

3. African nations must husband their scarce resources closely. Some, like Nigeria, South Africa, and others, are blessed with enough natural resources to produce some items for export. For instance, Liberia, a very poor nation beset by civil war, exports iron ore and contains the world's largest rubber plantation. However, the countries must avoid exploitation for the short term within reason, working instead for medium and long term solutions. No African nation except South Africa can feed itself. Agronomy declines as arable land is surrendered to the bush or is desertified, combined with population growth and urbanization, the obtainable resources will grow in value to the exporters.

Africa has a depressing history of squandering both the resources and the aid donated by western nations. African nations must concentrate on industries that improve

the gross national product while balancing the needs of the people.

4. Finally, despite the ethnic difficulty and nationalism, Africans are challenged by more and more examples of the benefits of strong economic confederation. Although the image of a pan-African economic union is dead, regional and subregional organizations will continue to prove their worth. The Africans face a considerable challenge.

This wide range of potentially destabilizing factors in Sub-Saharan Africa could mean an increase of the US role in the region. Any of these trends could reach a dangerous level of maturity, and thus substantially increased regional posture for the US. To remain proactive and sanguine, America must re-examine the UCP and its usefulness in Sub-Saharan Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR

TEST CASES FOR UNIFIED COMMAND

Introduction

This chapter postulates US military intervention in Subsaharan Africa--a phenomenon that exists as this thesis is written--to test the hypothesis that UCP changes are required. The US does not intervene in foreign nations on a whim; its overseas involvements are derived from three basic objectives:

"security against attack; maintenance of an international order in which the United States can survive and prosper; and, the idealistic attempt to ensure that the United States should, by example, or action, or both, exert influence toward the spread of more representative and responsive governments in the world."¹

In essence, the first goal, security, and the second, friendly markets, synthesize the third through a network of political, military, and economic connections that normally operate peacefully. However, when a Third World nation--especially those in Subsaharan Africa--suffers internal unrest and instability, its first response is very often forceful suppression or neutralization of the challenge through force. This reaction often escalates out of proportion to the danger and just as often causes an escalation in the degree of threat. If the government fails to contain

its endemic threat, outside intervention may be necessary to maintain the environment "in which the United States can survive and prosper."²

During the Cold War, the US avoided direct intervention as often as not. It did so for three reasons. First, commitment elsewhere, such as Vietnam or Central America. Second, prudence and priority of interest, where intervention could become a catalyst for open superpower confrontation. Third, because of a sense that other nations had interests more vital than ours, especially in Subsaharan Africa. In this case, the US government felt its interests would be better served by proxies. Nevertheless, the US saw its overall strategy as one of globalism; countering the worldwide communist menace.

Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the worldwide collapse of communism, the United States has become more globalist than ever before. America's professed emphasis on regional strategies created in the absence of a worldwide threat implies a desire to assume less of the burden of leadership, yet the language suggests that the US now has the resources and the will to devote to priorities not possible during the Cold War.

Always anxious to avoid direct intervention, America now finds itself besieged with calls and requests that it not abandon its global leadership role for a quasi-isolationism centered on a regional strategy. As the US weighs

its options, it must avoid being 'caught between a rock and a hard place,' balancing its desire to intervene where necessary--pulled by Third World incapacibilities and pushed by its own internal desire for globalism.³

In Subsaharan Africa, foreseeable American intervention could assume four guises. Three of these fall under the general heading of operations other than war and the fourth, humanitarian missions, comprises a class by itself.⁴ First, direct economic and military aid to counter internal instability and prevent it from progressing to insurrection; second, active counter-insurgency efforts (advisors and military training) to prevent insurrection from evolving into rebellion; third, limited war, designed to prevent open revolution from succeeding; and fourth, humanitarian missions, which fall under the supervision of the Department of State. The low intensity conflict (LIC) imperatives provide a definable criteria to evaluate command and control relationships for a US intervention in Subsaharan Africa.⁵

Four of the five LIC imperatives provide a framework with which to examine potential operations other than war in Subsaharan Africa conducted by an American unified command: political dominance; unity of effort; adaptability; and, perseverance.⁶

Unified commanders know that military objectives derive from political ones. Therefore, political dominance

is an inescapable requirement. All plans, procedures, and courses of action must support viable political objectives established by the National Command Authorities. This requires a command organization that can focus on political aspects.

Unity of effort is more unity of command, although military leaders must be careful to ensure that military command in the theater of operations flows from one person, the unified commander in chief. All governmental agencies, US and Allied alike, must progress with a mutually acceptable endstate. The military commander may be subordinate to on-scene civilian control, such as an Ambassador, or he may have subordinate to him civilian advisors who he directs.

Unlike a declared war, where the endstate may be unconditional surrender of enemy forces, LIC is characterized by fluid political situation. Therefore, military forces must remain adaptable to the situation, embarking on a new course of action when the situation demands it.

The concept of legitimacy is central to conflicting parties, for it is what they seek, simultaneously striving to de-legitimize all rivals. This imperative is crucial at all military levels involved in LIC. However, despite its value to low intensity conflict, command and control at the unified command level is rarely affected by this imperative. Thus, it was omitted.

By definition and experience, LIC operations are expected to be lengthy in duration. Perseverance is thus a prerequisite for involvement. Before involvement in these operations, all parties must understand the endstate may not be reached for months, perhaps years. Patient, careful analysis prior to action requires discipline and focus on the endstate to the exclusion of all else except the political goals. Certain examples of LIC, like non-combatant evacuation, may be accomplished in a few days or weeks. However, that assumes the sole reason for the mission is the desired endstate and requires continuity of command and expertise.

The following test cases include one actual operation and one potential one. After a description of the events that led to US intervention, the situation is analyzed using the LIC imperatives focusing on command and control implications.

Test Case 1 - Somalia

The US intervention in Somalia eases its use as an example; it provides a 'real-time' demonstration of unified command in Subsaharan Africa.

Background.

In January 1991, President Mohammed Siad Barre's (a member of the Marehan clan) authoritarian government fell to clan-based opposition forces with little in common except their hatred of Barre and his government. Having systemati-

cally ruined the agriculture-based economy, looted the treasury, and demolished the country's political infrastructure, the country descended into anarchy.⁷ As the Barre government fell, US forces, drawn from forces in the Persian Gulf (during Operation Desert Shield) executed Operation Eastern Exit, a non-combatant evacuation of US, allied, and friendly nationals from the Somali capital of Mogadishu.⁸

Though Somalis are ethnically homogenous, tribal clans dominate Somali society, undermining any sense of shared nationality. Barre's nominal successor, Ali Mahdi Mohammed (of the Abgal branch of the Hawedi clan) took office under controversial circumstances. Mohammed was himself challenged for leadership by General Mohammed Farah Aideed (of the Habr Gedir branch of the same Hawedi clan), further dividing the country.⁹ Fighting between the two factions centered on its capital of Mogadishu; Ali Mahdi Mohammed controlled the northern half and Mohammed Farah Aideed controlled the south. In addition, former military forces (the Ogadeni clan dominated the Army), loyal to Siad Barre were defeated and driven into Kenya.¹⁰ Throughout 1991, intra-Hawedi clan warfare dominated Somalia, especially Mogadishu and the surrounding southern and southwestern countryside, leaving Mohammed Farah Aideed in loose control of the city.¹¹ However, further splits in the Hawedi clan continued, leaving Mogadishu largely lawless.

Intensely aggravating the situation in Somalia is a four year drought which has left at least 300,000 people dead and many more dying of starvation.¹² Beginning in August, 1992, the US and other nations¹³ began delivering relief supplies to Mogadishu, but fewer than 25% were estimated to have reached the needy. The rest were stolen by both major and minor armed clans and factions, as well as freelance bandits. On 4 December 1992, after intense lobbying by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, President George Bush offered to send 30,000 troops to help restore order.¹⁴ Operation Restore Hope began on 9 December 1992, when Navy special operating forces went ashore, followed closely by Marine combat and combat support troops. In the weeks that followed, soldiers drawn predominantly from the 10th Mountain Division joined the Marines, along with Air Force personnel.

Analysis.

1. Political Dominance. The US intervention in Somalia represents the first time since Vietnam that the US interceded without direct provocation. America's involvement in Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Shield/Storm were direct reactions to provocative acts that clearly threatened US national security.¹⁵

In Somalia, the military atypically proposed the commitment of troops. During a meeting of the Deputies Committee¹⁶ on 21 November 1992, the Vice Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David Jeremiah, stated that US forces could end the violence and stabilize the situation.¹⁷

From the beginning, the US military intervention in Somalia claimed political legitimacy, despite the controversy and the unorthodoxy of the military mission. The immediate political objective--establish security for relief workers trying to feed the starving--required military action to get started. Almost immediately following the President's announcement of support for Somalia, President-elect Bill Clinton endorsed the objective, lending bipartisan support.¹⁸

During the first phases of American presence in Somalia, Marine LTG Robert Johnston, Commander, Joint Task Force, (CJTF) was clearly the person in charge. American Marines under his command conducted amphibious and heliborne landings near Mogadishu, then fanned out to take control of the city. Anticipating high interest among the American public, USCENTCOM and the Joint Staff announced a daily schedule of briefings similar to those given during the Persian Gulf War.

The purpose of the military operations was to create a secure environment for diplomats and politicians to negotiate an end to the anarchy and hostilities occurring all over Somalia. No escalation to peacemaking or war would be compatible with the desired endstate, a stabilized situation

in which to insert a UN controlled and directed peacekeeping force. Throughout the intervention, the US used relatively few tactical operations designed to destroy a threatening armed force. It preferred to use only that amount of force sufficient to establish control over the situation.

After the military reached all of their immediate objectives in and around Mogadishu, and secured the city, CJTF relinquished much of his authority to the US' special envoy, Ambassador Robert Oakley. Ambassador Oakley represented the end of the military phase and the beginning of the diplomatic stage.

Throughout the mission, the military commanders in Somalia tried to maintain a certain independence from the political machinations swirling about them, concentrating on the purely military tasks.¹⁹ The appearance of separation from the political decision-making should not misinterpreted as a lack of involvement, however. The military leaders understood the fundamental of political dominance and did their best to adhere to it, supporting the political objective. Eventually, the American populace shifted its attention to other events. USCENTCOM and its JTF commander had demonstrated the American value of civilian control of the military--the preeminence of the political instrument.

The US originally maintained that security for relief workers was its only concern. Requests by the UN Secretariat that the US assume the role of pacification and

train police force were not possible under the terms used to intervene.²⁰

2. Unity of Effort. Once President Bush decided to act, the mission was passed to the Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), whose Area of Responsibility includes Somalia. USCINCCENT requested and was assigned supporting forces from US Pacific Command, US Forces Command, US Transportation Command, US European Command, and US Special Operations Command. In addition, several allied and friendly nations offered contingents.

Initial unity of effort was not hard to establish. American military forces established secure lodgements and then began operations to clear lines of communication to inland towns and villages so relief workers could distribute food. The US-led military forces cooperated with various UN organizations, US governmental organizations now established in Somalia to try develop stability and start the economy again through diplomacy.

Maintaining that initial unity of effort is more difficult than originally anticipated, though the military unity and chain of command has never been stronger. The military must follow and integrate its actions with those of the civilian leaders, which it has done. The civilian leadership is split over the role of the armed forces in Somalia. US and UN desires and objectives remain polar opposites.²¹ Though US forces recognize only US civilian

authority, the international controversies surrounding the disposition of American military forces have an undesirable effect on the struggle for unity of effort. They send welcome signals to the more radical Somali factions about the fractured confederation that is trying to restore order.

The one organization that has not cooperated fully with the US position is the UN Secretariat. The Secretariat maintains a combined military force, UN supervised and manned, will allow the country to slip back into civil war. UN peacekeeping forces have an unfortunate history of being largely ineffective and self-perpetuating.²² UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali wants US troops to remain indefinitely, overseeing a UN-established protectorate. In addition, in what can only be described as a controversial and puzzling move, the UN retained Iraqi diplomat Ismat Kittani as its special envoy to Somalia. Kittani had trouble dealing with Somali leaders working toward a common goal. Ironically, a UN peacekeeping force patrols southern Iraq.²³

3. Adaptability. The unified command structure provides perhaps the most adaptable organizational formation in the US armed forces. Unified commands are assigned forces based upon the various missions the command must be prepared to conduct. Routinely, they exercise combatant command authority over forces designated as part of their air, land and sea components. In Somalia, USCINCENT com-

mands forces drawn from command relationships with most of the other unified commands. All of these forces must adapt to a situation and a chain of command unfamiliar to them. Thus, special forces units (commanded by USCINCSOC), aviation units (commanded by USCINCEUR), infantry units (commanded by USCINCFOR), naval units (commanded USCINCPAC), and air force units (commanded by USCINCTrans) all must adapt to the USCENTCOM AOR. Each must modify command and control relationships and developing new methods and procedures as necessary.²⁴

Another area of adaptability is in the incorporation of diplomats and civilian bureaucratic departments into the command. In all US unified commands and with many joint task forces, the commander is assigned a political advisor. Normally this advisor functions as the commander's right arm, smoothing out the diplomatic wrinkles.

However, soldiers working in hostile territory often resent civilian-imposed restraints on their use of violence to achieve their objectives. They must be receptive to unfamiliar and perhaps unorthodox methods to accomplish their mission. In the same fashion, civilian representatives rarely experience the intensity of working in a hostile environment and must adapt. All information about the US intervention in Somalia indicates that soldiers and civilians alike have learned to adapt to their surroundings and conditions.

In this situation, USCENTCOM had some advantages over other unified commands that could have been tasked to perform this mission. First, the CJTF served as the USCENTCOM Chief of Staff in Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War; he has recent experience with military intervention. Second, USCENTCOM conducted a NEO operation in Somalia during Operation Desert Storm. Third, the small size of the USCENTCOM AOR allows more attention to be focused on fewer nations. Fourth, military troops--primarily Marines armed with tanks and medium artillery and supported by Navy and Marine carrier-based aircraft--are deployed in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean on Navy vessels. Fifth, thanks to the Persian Gulf War, USCENTCOM has a forward deployed headquarters in Saudi Arabia. USCENTCOM (Forward) is capable of high-level planning and coordination for assistance into the AOR.

Had USEUCOM or USPACOM tried to execute the operation, both commands would have faced difficulties of distance, exhibited inexperience in controlling the operations of large scale forces deploying into Africa. In USEUCOM's case, the command would have been forced to work with Navy and Marine forces, something it does infrequently, since its primary orientation has been Eastern Europe.

4. Perseverance. The US involvement with Somalia dates back to its independence, though the recent intervention can be traced back just over one year. In January

1992, Aideed's forces wrested control of Mogadishu from Mohammed's and effectively took control of all incoming and outgoing traffic, most of which was privately funded starvation relief aid. US Air Force planes began airlifting supplies into Mogadishu beginning in August 1992. Private and public philanthropic organizations (some with US government backing) had begun flights long before that.

Shortly after midnight on 9 December 1992, the first acknowledged landings by US combat forces occurred in Somalia. Simultaneously, the President publicly expressed his intention to withdraw those forces by 20 January 1993. Despite the token withdrawal of some forces, the majority remained behind, with no subsequent withdrawal date established. Thus, the US forces have embarked on what is clearly an assignment that may develop into a very long term assignment. US forces must therefore endure the conditions in Somalia indefinitely, exhibiting patience and persistence in their daily missions to provide security and disarm the populace.

The command and control challenge to the unified CINC in Somalia is and has been one of avoiding any temptation to apply a 'quick-fix' to the problem. The threat is hard to isolate due to the large number of autonomous armed groups and the complete lack of any legitimate government. These factors are aggravated by the humanitarian relief problem and the profound lack of existing infrastructure.

The groups of hostile natives are significantly weaker and less well organized than the US and UN intervention forces that plan to establish control. Therefore, to preserve what power they do possess, they must be prepared to seek small victories. A large assault would undoubtedly result in their defeat. The CJTF must assume that the hostile clans are willing to be patient and persevere. His forces must the same endure.

The American involvement and intervention in Somalia has evolved and metamorphosed from humanitarian relief flights into a large-scale air, ground, and sea presence, combined with contingents from allied and friendly nations. Throughout, the soldiers assigned to the Joint Task Force--Somalia have persevered and accomplished their missions.

The American and allied intervention in Somalia--still underway as of this writing--was planned, executed, commanded, and controlled with the LIC imperatives acting its foundation. The command and control mechanisms used by USCENTCOM and its joint task force gained and supported the fundamental of political dominance. By minimizing violence, the JTF created a secure environment for diplomatic efforts to begin. Proper use of command and control systems forged a dedicated, unified effort, encompassing not only American civilian bureaucracies but also those of foreign nations and the UN. They encouraged US military forces and civilian agencies to adapt to one another as well as confusing

political and undeveloped geographical landscapes. Finally, proper command and control functions persevered in appalling physical and mental circumstances, all to achieve its objective of humanitarian relief and assistance. The political crisis that has gripped Somalia for so many years continues, but its battles are largely confined to diplomats' conference rooms rather than the streets of Mogadishu.

Test Case 2 - Liberia

The US has not intervened to end the Liberian civil war with military force, preferring to leave the situation to the regional association, Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) and its Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). A scenario for US action in Liberia follows the background discussion.

Background.

Established in 1822 by freed slaves from the United States, Liberia gained its independence on 26 July 1847. It was and is the closest thing America has to a Subsaharan African colony.²⁵ The descendants of the freed slaves comprise no more than ten percent of the 2.4 million population.²⁶ However, they have dominated Liberian politics and society throughout the history of the nation.

On 12 April 1980, Army Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, a member of the indigenous Krahn tribe, led a bloody coup, overthrowing the government of President William R. Tolbert. Doe declared himself chairman of the People's

Redemption Council, whose members were other noncommissioned officers and junior enlisted men, and promised a return to democratic, constitutional rule in April 1985. Instead, Doe rigged the elections and stole the election.

On 24 December 1989, Charles Taylor, a disgruntled former government employee and close associate of Doe's, began an armed insurrection in Liberia's Nimba County after crossing the Noun River from Cote d'Ivoire. Taylor's organization, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), overwhelmed most opposition groups (which were divided along tribal/ethnic lines) and besieged the capital, Monrovia on 2 July 1990. Two weeks later, the NPFL split, with the break-away faction (called the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INFPL)) led by Prince Y. Johnson. All of Monrovia--except the fortified Presidential Palace--remained in either Johnson's or Taylor's hands.²⁷

On 9 September 1990, President Doe left his compound to visit the commander of the ECOMOG force. Before he could arrive at ECOMOG headquarters, he was captured by Prince Johnson's forces. After being tortured overnight, Doe was killed.²⁸

On 24 August 1990 the ECOWAS dispatched a coalition force to Monrovia. ECOMOG was comprised of two infantry battalions from Nigeria, one each from Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, and one company from The Gambia. A conference of ECOWAS nations in Banjul, The Gambia, oversaw a conven-

tion of Liberian political factions and chose Dr. Amos Sawyer as Interim President. Dr. Sawyer, a US-educated, distinguished Liberian scholar and former political science professor at Indiana University, was executive director of the Association for Constitutional Democracy in Liberia, headquartered in Washington, DC.²⁹ On 21 November 1990, Sawyer was inaugurated. Regional 'diplomacy' appeared to have worked, a victory for a region not known for or credited with either tact or fighting acumen.³⁰

For the next two years, a fragile cease-fire was in effect while ECOWAS tried to establish a peace plan amenable to all parties. Charles Taylor, in charge of about 90 percent of the country outside Monrovia, refused to attend, setting up his own government in "Taylorland."³¹ The elections, first promised for October 1991 and later moved to October 1992, were not held.

On 15 October 1992, Taylor and his 20,000 men abandoned any pretext of support for a peaceful solution and began an all-out assault on the city and ECOMOG. Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, and Guinea each sent in more troops, which increased ECOMOG forces to 11,000.³² ECOMOG also bombed concentrations of Taylor's men located on the huge Firestone rubber plantation near Buchanan.

After five months of combat, Taylor and the NPFL forces began an eastward retreat, heading back toward the jungles of the Liberia-Cote d'Ivoire border. The ECOMOG

forces, faced with violating the international border, ordered another ceasefire. Though it claimed to create a buffer zone in northeastern Liberia and could not violate an international border, ECOMOG had merely expanded its defensive perimeter around Monrovia, a situation can best be described as temporary, since Taylor's NPFL forces remain armed, at large and unrestricted in their movements.³³

Establishing a buffer zone is--despite its appearance of transience--one of the hallmarks of successful peacekeeping. A buffer zone was one of the criteria established for the second United Nations Emergency Force, established and placed in operation in the Mideast in October 1973.³⁴

US intervention in Liberia has not been necessary since Operation Sharp Edge, a short-duration non-combatant evacuation conducted in 1990.³⁵ In this situation, a large-scale US intervention force would most likely come under the command of USCINCEUR, since Liberia lies within EUCOM's area of responsibility.

Scenario.

In response to a JCS warning order, the United States has two divisions, both from U.S. Army, Europe, on alert to deploy to Bosnia-Herzegovina and begin combat operations. The deployment order is expected shortly.

After three years of little progress toward peace and in the face of upwardly spiraling costs to maintain

their troops on foreign territory, all the nations contributing to the ECOMOG force elect to withdraw their forces--except Nigeria. The internal political situation resembles that of Somalia in 1992: First, complete breakdown of civil authority and order everywhere outside the ECOMOG perimeter. Second, a steadily increasing number of gruesome atrocities and reprisals committed against minority ethnic groups. Third, impending starvation among the Liberian people who inhabit the country, especially the remote areas. In addition, the neighboring countries of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Cote d'Ivoire, have begun forcibly deporting back to Liberia the hundreds of thousands of refugees who earlier had crossed the borders to escape the fighting.

Nigeria, embarrassed by the failure of its leadership of ECOMOG and unable to support the Sawyer government any longer, found its troops in danger of military defeat. Already dazed by increased religious tension, economic stagnation, and increased restriction of their civil liberties, the Nigerian people view the untenable military situation, the rising death toll in Liberia, and the withdrawal of allies from ECOMOG as a direct result of their military chiefs' leadership failure. Faced with international humiliation and anxious to reclaim their place as the leaders of West Africa, thousands take to the streets to protest any further involvement in Liberia. Soon, the protests expanded

to include a demand an end to the six-year military dictatorship of General Ibrahim Babangida.

At the first sign of unrest in Nigeria, revolutionaries and professional terrorists, trained and resourced by Libya, North Korea, and Iraq, spring into action and attack Nigeria's oil production facilities, refineries and government institutions. Their propaganda claims that all resources belong to the common people, not the ruling military elite. Largely successful in their raids, the insurgents encourage and develop a following among the people. Despite the anti-military tone of the revolutionaries, idealistic, junior military officers are especially vulnerable to the charismatic claims of the insurgents. Regional instability, once contained to Liberia, now threatens the strongest nation in West Africa. Nigeria appeals to the US for assistance in developing a counterinsurgency program and force, and to assume the peacekeeping role in Liberia. The consequences of failing to act are continued violence and destabilization through the spread of civil war throughout the region.

The United States is a nominal supporter of Nigeria because it is the nation most likely to lead West Africa into the 21st Century. It recognizes that the situation has deteriorated beyond the point where the African nations can solve the problem without outside help. Despite the threat of combat action in southeastern Europe, the US National

Command Authorities direct the conduct of a military operation with four goals. First, secure the Liberian capital of Monrovia and establish a peacekeeping force to secure American and other foreign nationals and protect their property by installing a buffer zone between warring factions. Second, begin counter-insurgency operations. Third, provide security for relief workers to dispense humanitarian aid throughout the interior of the country. Fourth, be prepared to deploy additional forces into Nigeria if the situation there deteriorates further.

Analysis.

1. Political Dominance. The political objectives drive the military missions. In this scenario, the real mission is stabilization of West Africa.

West Africa comprises several mostly small states that must be considered both singularly and collectively in any plans. If handled properly, these small African nations could improve their long-term relationships with the US. By contrast, if treated as an unwanted burden, they could turn against the US, harboring insurgents and acting as accomplices for Libya, North Korea, Iraq, and other unfriendly nations. Securing this region of Africa could improve economies and social conditions enough to bring the region out of its welfare mentality. To start the stabilization process, the US will insert a peacekeeping force.

Liberia falls in USEUCOM's AOR; therefore, that unified command must assign forces in order to carry out the mission of intervention. If the forces based in Europe are inadequate or are not of the optimal mix, then other forces must be designated mobilized, and deployed.

Since its inception, USEUCOM has focused on countering the Soviet threat. For many years, REFORGER exercises have tested the command's ability to plan and employ predominantly heavy forces in the European theater. During other years, BRIGHT STAR exercises--usually involving the 101st Airborne Division--took place in Egypt and Northern Africa. Significantly, none of these exercises took place in Sub-Saharan Africa, although USEUCOM has provided some military training and small nation-assistance and support activities.

USEUCOM's indifference toward Sub-Saharan Africa reflects both the dead-last priority the region occupies in the national and defense strategies³⁶ and the command's traditional orientation toward high intensity conflict. Terrorism--a form of low intensity conflict--exists in Europe, but the US generally considers it a domestic issue, best handled by local police. During the Persian Gulf War, USEUCOM supported USCENTCOM in Turkey and northern Iraq, an environment less intense than in the southern part of the country.

The Liberian scenario is low-intensity conflict. Can a unified command whose traditional focus has been high-

intensity nuclear war redirect its planning efforts toward the low end of the operational continuum? The answer is yes--LIC doctrine exists--but it would require a reorientation of the command.

To achieve political primacy, USEUCOM planners would have to consider sufficient military force to bring belligerents to the diplomats' table, rather than orienting on destruction of a major, nuclear capable force. Large-scale military operations might be necessary, but primarily to achieve stability. In this environment, escalation to war and wide-spread destruction are counterproductive. USEUCOM's traditional heavy forces would not work as well in Liberia as they do in Europe.

2. Unity of Effort. In the scenario, US forces stationed in western Europe are preparing for deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina. USCINCEUR must contend with two diverse, geographically separated missions that could ultimately involve thousands of troops deployed from the US. The CINC has options: one, request relief and reassignment of the Liberia mission to another unified command, possibly USLANTCOM; two, requesting relief and reassignment of the Bosnia mission to either to USLANTCOM, or directly to the Commander, US Army, Europe; or, three, splitting his assets between the European and African missions by creating two joint task forces. Further analysis might reveal more options, but these are three of the most likely.

Requesting relief from either assignment would place a significant burden on the command that assumes the mission. The command assuming the mission would have to work either with a plan that it had not developed or was familiar with--or write one from scratch. Neither possibility would enhance the unity of the command's effort. In all likelihood, the plan would not address all questions or contingencies because of a lack of familiarity with the region. Dividing the USEUCOM staff into two groups, with one group for Liberia and one for Europe might be feasible, but it requires USCINCEUR to divide his attention as well--and between two very different battlefield environments, each with their own characteristics.

Nevertheless, requesting relief from the Liberian mission is the most likely course of action for USCINCEUR. His primary area of responsibility is and has always been Europe. With trouble in the Balkans, he can ill-afford to try and direct simultaneous operations thousands of miles apart. Realistically, the CJCS would make the decision well prior to any commitment of troops.

After determining which CINC would handle the Liberian mission, the next step would be to build a consensus among the West African nations. General accusations of US imperialism, Nigerian demands, and Liberia's neighbors, actions in support of rebel leaders are a few of the other potential problems that would affect unity of command.

US intervention would bring US predominance in the theater. The United States attempted to remain out of Liberian politics during its civil war because of historic associations and guilt over the amount of support and political legitimacy given the Samuel Doe regime. In the scenario, any hopes the US had of serving as an honest broker disappeared. Implicitly, military intervention brings intervention in other areas as well, such as political, economic, psychological and social.

In addition, because several governments would be involved, the expected interagency coordination and communication between the US military and US agencies could be aggravated. In this scenario, US commanders would control all activities in Liberia until a State Department representative could take charge.

3. Adaptability. A successful operation in Liberia--or anywhere in Subsaharan Africa--will require the forces assigned to adapt to a different kind of warfare. Donald M. Snow's Third World Conflict and American Response in the Post-Cold War World, outlines three critical points of difference from conventional war that would affect the US' forces ability to adapt.²⁷

First, the scenario presented is more intensely political than conventional maneuver warfare and requires significant adjustment. The insurgency is only partly military. What the rebels really want is to achieve their

political objectives. Thus, counterinsurgency operations must be conducted in addition to peacekeeping operations to regain a legitimate and functioning government. The CINC and his forces must be careful and watch both political means and ends so that they do not contradict one another. Identification of the actor within Liberia that holds legitimate power is paramount for success.

Second, US soldiers must adapt to an unfamiliar physical environment and different methods of fighting. The majority of career soldiers who fought in Vietnam have retired; those with mid- and junior-grade combat experience earned it in the desert of Southwestern Asia, where the ground campaign lasted a fraction over four days. Except for the actions in Grenada and Panama, the modern American Army has not faced a highly mobile, small unit-based adversary for many years. Fighting in a swampy jungle against an enemy armed and trained by Libya and North Korea would demonstrate the inadequacy of armored warfare tactics and techniques to meet all situations. It would also call into question traditional American reliance on heavy forces and firepower.

Third, American action or inaction invites opposition and criticism from abroad. Traditional American values cause the US to respond favorably to most overtures for aid and consideration of a particular plight.

Competing with the situation in Liberia is Bosnia-Herzegovina and the issue of divided command and control. Though proper unity of command would demand a unified command other than USEUCOM to command and control the Iiberian operation, resourcing both contingencies simultaneously would be a problem. The inability to resource both would render the scenario unrealistic. The lack of domestic resources could expand the length of American involvement in both nations.

The final area requiring adaptation on the part of Americans falls under health risks. Comprehensive health care is the soldier's right--and rightfully so, if Americans expect soldiers to risk death or wounds for their country. However, the risk of disease in Subsaharan Africa is so great that it is likely to cause the vast majority of casualties.

Considering the spread of AIDS alone, the World Health Organization estimated that in July 1991, eleven million African adults and at least one million African children carried the HIV virus.³⁰ In addition, it estimates that the number of infected adults will reach 25 million by the year 2000, and the number of infected children will approach six million. Another six million children will have lost both parents to the disease. If HIV infects a large portion of Subsaharan African managers--often the only level of middle class in a nation--as well as

a large proportion of young laborers, the economic impact to the continent would be devastating.

In addition to a very high percentage of AIDS victims, soldiers would come into contact with malaria, typhus, typhoid, and tuberculosis. The impact on American soldiers could be profound; thanks to American medical practices, few doctors have ever seen an active tubercular or malarial patient. The CINC would have to ensure his soldiers would be prepared before deployment to reduce the affects of disease. Soldiers would receive immunizations before deployment, thus reducing the chances of infection. However, the vast number of other diseases, including diarrheal parasites, would still make a large impact.

4. Perseverance. The recent experiences of Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Shield/Storm may have anesthetized Americans into complacency about the conduct of future conflict. An American intervention in Liberia in the given scenario or a situation similar to it could not be expected to result in the same kind of combat operations and limited casualties. By nature, low intensity conflict operations last for long periods. The CINC and his subordinates must be prepared to endure for as long as it takes to achieve whatever national goals are set.

The command and control challenge to the unified CINC in Liberia is similar to the one described in the Somalia case. A 'quick-fix' to the problem is not likely to

work, due to the threat. The current situation in Liberia is larger and more distinct than in Somalia, but it still consists of large numbers of opposing armed groups and the complete lack of any legitimate government. Like Somalia, infrastructure is almost non-existent outside the main population centers. The extent of the humanitarian relief problem is enormous.

Because of the jungle terrain, it would be far easier for small armed groups to slip away from the US intervention forces that plan to establish control. US forces must seek small victories, defeating the insurgents slowly and over time.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Summary

For the first time in nearly fifty years, American combat forces serve on African soil, and for only the second time ever in Subsaharan Africa.¹ The US Joint Task Force in Somalia is comprised of several forces routinely subordinate to other unified commands; all of these units are subordinate to USCENTCOM because Somalia lies within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.

When this thesis was conceived, America had no military forces stationed in Somalia, Liberia, or South Africa. A few units, mostly Special Forces teams, performed mobile training team missions in some Subsaharan African nations, but these had little or no public visibility. Since December 1992, the US has deployed several thousand combat troops to Somalia. Despite assurances to Americans and Somalis alike that the mission was humanitarian in nature, scores of Somalis have been killed and wounded. While US casualties have been very light, some Americans have died or been wounded.

From an experience and organization perspective, it is fortunate that USCENTCOM has responsibility for Somalia

and that Somalia has an extensive coastline. USCENTCOM was the unified command responsible for the successful prosecution of the Persian Gulf War and had conducted a NEO operation in Somalia during Operation Desert Shield. The primary area of operations lies in proximity to the coast and to the port city and capital of Mogadishu. Had Somalia been landlocked or threatened by external military forces, Operation Restore Hope might have taken on a far more forbidding character.

In addition, had Somalia been included in the USEUCOM area of responsibility, like the majority of Subsaharan Africa, the planning and execution of the operation might not have gone as smoothly. This does not mean that USEUCOM staff could not have handled the mission, but that it would have been more difficult. USEUCOM was and is predominantly concerned with other issues closer in importance to the historical role of the command: the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, addressing the large reduction of NATO forces in Europe, and reaching an understanding of the former Warsaw Pact nations. It is doubtful that USEUCOM could have reacted as quickly to prepare a humanitarian mission to central Subsaharan Africa of unknown duration, in an area generally considered expendable to the historical mission of the command, and in an area where it has little experience, in spite of its responsibility, .

Significantly, the CJCS report on roles and missions released 10 February 1993² contained changes to only one of the geography-based unified commands, USLANTCOM. That command's mission now includes the continental US. The new nations of Eastern Europe and the CIS are still not located within USEUCOM's Area of Responsibility. For now, these nations remain the responsibility of the CJCS. Similarly, Sub-Saharan Africa remains the responsibility of USEUCOM.

The US views its interests in Africa as transient and of finite duration. The US joint task force in Somalia, though nominally part of a UN force, representing several other nations, is not programmed to remain in Somalia indefinitely. Part of the price for American participation was withdrawal of the task force as soon as the UN force developed the capability of operations without US help and leadership. Another was the assurance by UN officials that the US effort in Somalia would not be used as a ploy to gain US military commitments in other troubled regions.³

Throughout most of US history, America's military interests and concerns in Sub-Saharan Africa have rarely occupied more than a few paragraphs in official publications. Today is no different. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney's proposed Regional Defense Strategy devoted only one short paragraph to Sub-Saharan Africa out of 24 pages.⁴

As long as the US continues to consider its long term interests in Africa less important than those of Europe

and Japan, then passing mention is what will have to suffice. The tenets that guided American policy in Africa during the years since the Kennedy Administration continue in use today: containment of communism (primarily during the Cold War, but now more of Marxist-inspired civil wars and insurgencies), restriction of resources channeled to Africa because of unstable governments, and determined efforts to construct policy that complements that of America's European (and former colonial power) allies.

The truth is that while the US does have indisputable military interests in Subsaharan Africa, these interests are not vital unless, as former Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger said, "...the United States says it is."

Devising a cogent defense policy or program for Subsaharan Africa would be fiercely intimidating. The diversity of the continent's many rulers alone ensures that a general policy, personified by a new unified command could not apply in most circumstances. US military strategies that would include the forward basing of US forces on the African continent would require domestic support. Forces would be under very close international scrutiny, and be required to support very important US interests elsewhere in the world. US military presence on the continent for the very restricted purposes such as non-combatant evacuation or the humanitarian reasons so evident in Somalia are the most

acceptable reasons for intervention. Containing a guerilla war in Africa does not have the same meaning that it would if it was in South America or Europe. Despite projects like Operation Restore Hope and the spread of famine and anarchy throughout the continent, Subsaharan Africa is and will remain on the periphery of American military strategy.

Conclusions: Subsaharan Africa and US Defense Strategy

Despite the current US military presence in Subsaharan Africa or the possibility of increased presence, either in Somalia, Liberia, Sudan, or other African nation approaching political chaos, no new unified command is needed to direct or respond to the military interests of the United States in Subsaharan Africa. The issue is not one-sided. Many reasons exist to support the formation of a new US military headquarters whose predominant area of responsibility is Subsaharan Africa, but more and better reasons exist to avoid doing so. The Unified Command Plan exists to create an environment in which military leaders and theater commanders prepare to fight wars in support of US national interests. Therefore, the establishment of a new unified command would have to support the US national interest. In this case, it does not.

This analysis argues for a change based on USEUCOM's split personality and the large number of countries for which it retains responsibility. If a change is to be made to the UCP regarding Subsaharan Africa, further studies are

needed focusing on the suitability transferring responsibility for the region to the US Southern Command, the US Atlantic Command, or the US Central Command.

By the end of the decade, USSOUTHCOM headquarters will no longer be in Quarry Heights, Panama. USSOUTHCOM will retain its focus on South America and conducting counter-narcotics operations to reduce the amount of dangerous drugs brought into the country. Narcotics traffic flows from Africa as well as South America; it would be relatively simple to smuggle large amounts of drugs into the US on ships registered in Africa. If USSOUTHCOM is to retain the lead on the military counter-narcotics effort, it makes sense to place all resources at its disposal, including African points of production and refinement.

Another possibility would be US Atlantic Command, although that command will soon take on the responsibility for all forces based in the continental US. When the CJCS roles and missions report is implemented. The addition of Subsaharan Africa might prove overwhelming and produce a three-way schism in the headquarters: one group planning for CONUS forces, another planning for Atlantic Ocean contingencies, and still another planning for Africa.

A third alternative would be to transfer the Subsaharan African AOR to US Central Command. Currently, USCENTCOM is the smallest unified command. It has the least square mileage and it has the fewest number of sovereign

nations located within its AOR (excluding USLANTCOM, most of whose are in the Caribbean). USCENTCOM already has responsibility for the eastern tier of African states from Egypt in the north to Kenya in the south. Adding the rest of contiguous Subsaharan Africa could be accomplished rather easily. USCENTCOM has experience in the region, having been involved in Somalia twice in the past two years, as well as in peacekeeping, humanitarian, and nation-building assignments. All of these missions could arise elsewhere in Subsaharan Africa.

Only one reason exists for leaving the situation as it is now. Subsaharan Africa remains at the bottom of America's regional priorities and despite intervention in Somalia, it is not likely to change. Transferring responsibility of a region from one unified command to another unified command without upgrading that region's importance and status serves no discernable purpose.

Transfer of a region from one unified command AOR to another should only be made for reasons that simplify the CINC's ability to exercise command and control.

Conspicuously, Subsaharan African Regional interests are not a factor. Receiving over \$35 billion in direct foreign aid each year, along with Africa's inability to govern, feed, and heal itself decently has turned the majority of the continent into a group of welfare-recipients."

In Somalia, USCENTCOM has exercised command and control through its JTF, and it has worked reasonably well. The command has been able to capitalize on lessons learned during its previous experience controlling joint and combined forces in the Persian Gulf War. The situation in Somalia is a low-intensity conflict and exhibits the all qualities and characteristics of operations other than war. The LIC imperatives have been respected and maintained thus far. Victory--defined as a stabilized Somalia with UN peacekeepers in place, not US soldiers--appears more possible with each passing day.

In the Liberian scenario, USEUCOM is charged with executing command and control functions despite preparing simultaneously for deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The only alternative to dividing USEUCOM command and control between two separate and very different theaters is for the National Command Authorities to relieve USEUCOM of one responsibility or the other. Clearly, requiring USEUCOM to maintain command and control for such widely diverse areas as Europe, North Africa (which is more Arab than African) and Subsaharan Africa is very difficult. It demands USEUCOM's planners consider and create contingency plans for combat operations or operations other than war in dissimilar environments and against very different threats. Transferring the region to USCENTCOM or USLANTCOM would alleviate USEUCOM of one of its regions without stretching the command

and control requirements of either of the other two commands too far.

The reasons for the overall malaise in Subsaharan Africa will not disappear or fade away on their own. Political, economic, and social failure and instability will continue, and aggravated by disease, become more of a problem for the modern world. The United States is involved in this region now and its involvement will grow. The US should assign the region to a unified command more capable of commanding and controlling military operations--both war and other than war--than USEUCOM.

Notes

Chapter 1

¹ Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 27 September 1938, BBC Radio Broadcast, as quoted by William Manchester in The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill, 1932-1940 (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1988), 348.

² Several nations still espouse the Marxist ideal; among them are the People's Republic of China and Cuba.

³ President of the United States George Bush, National Security of the United States (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991), 25-31. Emphasis on forward-deployed US forces changed to emphasis on CONUS-based, rapidly deployable forces.

⁴ Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, quoted by David Gergen in "The Burdens of a Superpower," US News and World Report 23 (December 1992): 110.

⁵ Barry E. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1978), 23, 547-553.

⁶ Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), 70-71.

⁷ Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985), 22.

⁸ President Bush, National Security of the United States, 25-31. Bush delivered his speech on the very day Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait; his message was published the following August.

⁹ Robert W. Komer, Maritime Strategy or Coalition De-fense? (Cambridge: Abt Books, 1984), xvii.

Chapter 2

¹ David D. Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1885), 95-96, quoted by Ronald S. Mangum in "The Vicksburg Campaign: A Study in Joint Operations," Parameters 21 (Autumn 1991), 74-86.

² Mangum, 74-86.

³ Geoffrey Perret, There's a War to be Won (New York: Random House, 1991), 128.

⁴ Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Defense Organization: The Need for Change (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985), 277.

⁵ Ibid, 278.

⁶ Ibid, 279.

⁷ Department of Defense, AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991), 2-10 - 2-11.

⁸ Senate Armed Services Staff Report, 293.

⁹ US Army Command and General Staff College, FB 050-1, Fundamentals of Joint and Combined Operations (Fort Leavenworth: CGSC, 1992), 37-38.

¹⁰ Thomas B. McClain, The Complete Handbook on America's Military Commitments (Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1969), 97.

¹¹ Department of Defense, Defense 92 Almanac (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1992), 46. The US maintains several collective security treaties. Their names, signatories, and effective dates are:

a. North Atlantic Treaty; Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, US; April 4, 1949.

b. Anzus Treaty; Australia, New Zealand, US; September 1, 1951 (On September 17, 1986, the US suspended its obligations to New Zealand under the treaty.).

c. Rio Treaty; Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, US, Uruguay, Venezuela; September 2, 1947.

d. Southeast Asia Treaty; Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, US; September 8, 1954 (The organization ceased to exist on June 30, 1977. The collective defense treaty remains in effect.).

e. Philippine Treaty; Philippines, US; September 1, 1951.

f. Japanese Treaty; Japan, US; January 19, 1960.

g. Korea Treaty; Korea, US; October 1, 1953.

¹² Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, "Grand Strategy and the Structure of US Military Forces," Strategic Review 2 (Spring 1992) 39-51.

¹³ Ibid, 42.

¹⁴ President George Bush, "United States Defense: Reshaping Our Forces," Delivered at the Aspen Institute, Aspen Colorado, August 2, 1990, in Vital Speeches of the Day 22 (September 1990) 677.

¹⁵ President Bush, quoted by Bartlett and Holman, 44.

¹⁶ President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991), v.

¹⁷ James L. George, The US Navy in the 1990's: Alternatives for Action (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), xxii.

¹⁸ President Bush, National Strategy of the United States, 7.

¹⁹ Ann Florini and Nina Tannenwald, On the Front Lines: The United Nations Role in Preventing and Containing Conflict (New York: United Nations Association of the United States of America Publishing, 1984), 8.

²⁰ William Branigin, "A Costly Way to Keep the Peace," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition 6 (Washington DC: The Washington Post Publishing Company, 1992), 9-10.

²¹ Ibid, 10.

²² William Branigin, "United Frustrations," The Washington Post Weekly Edition 5 (Washington, DC: The Washington Post Publishing Company, 1992), 6-7.

²³ Branigin, Peacekeeping Costs, 10.

Chapter 3

¹ During the Suez crisis of 1956, the US formed an uneasy alliance with the Soviet Union in order to counter a combined British-French-Israeli operation. After Egyptian President Nasser nationalized the Suez canal, Britain, and France felt their vital interests threatened and invaded the canal zone, coinciding their attack with an Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula. The US felt the British-French action smacked of colonialism and would be used by the Soviets to demonstrate the West's imperialistic intentions.

- ² Sanford J. Ungar, Africa: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 469-471.
- ³ Scott Fisher, Coping With Change: United States Policy Toward South Africa (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), 39-40.
- ⁴ JCS guidance in the case of denied overflight rights would be to ignore them, unless the anti-aircraft threat were significant, in which case the denying country might face treatment reserved for hostile combatants.
- ⁵ Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), 136-143.
- ⁶ W. Scott Thompson, "US Policy Toward Africa: At America's Service?" Africa in the Post-Colonialization Period, Richard E. Bissell and Michael S. Radu, eds., (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984), 125. Thompson quotes Arthur M. Schlesinger's book A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965).
- ⁷ Michael L. Smith, "American and Soviet Security Assistance in Subsaharan Africa: An Effectiveness Appraisal," (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Unpublished MMAS Thesis, 1988), 50.
- ⁸ Ibid, 50. Smith quotes Mohamed A. El-Khawas, "US Foreign Policy Toward Africa, 1960-1972," Current Bibliography on African Affairs (July 1972), 408.
- ⁹ Thomas P. Odom, Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988) 61-87.
- ¹⁰ Thompson, "US Policy", 123.
- ¹¹ Bruce E. Arlinghaus, "African Crisis and Conflict," The Future of Conflict in the 1980's, William J. Taylor and Robert L. Wendzel, eds., (Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1982), 373-377.
- ¹² Richard E. Bissell, "An Introduction to the New Africa," Africa in the Post-Decolonialization Period, Richard E. Bissell and Michael S. Radu, eds., (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984), 4-5.
- ¹³ Keith B. Richburg, "Why is Africa Eating Asia's Dust?" The Washington Post National Weekly Edition 40 (July 1992), 11.
- ¹⁴ Arlinghaus, "African Crisis," 373-377.

¹⁵ Richburg, "Eating Asia's Dust", 12. Richburg quoted Pauline Baker, Senior Editor, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

¹⁶ Ibid, 11. Richburg's source for economic data was the World Bank.

Chapter 4

¹ John L. S. Girling, America and the Third World: Revolution and Intervention (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 122.

² Ibid, 122.

³ Matthew Cooper, "When a World Beckons America," US News and World Report 114 (March 1993), 10-11.

⁴ It is possible that a form of interstate warfare could arise, especially because Africa's tribes and ethnic groups recognize few of the political boundaries left by the colonial powers as binding on their ancestral lands. However, such a war is more likely to remain low-intensity, with a patriarchal state supporting adjacent rebels through clandestine means rather than resorting to overt acts.

⁵ US Departments of the Army and the Air Force, FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (1990), 1-5, 1-6. FM 100-20 states that LIC operations involve activities in two or more of four operational categories: support for insurgency and counterinsurgency; combatting terrorism; peacekeeping operations; and, peacetime contingency operations.

⁶ Ibid., 1-5.

⁷ "Even Greater Problems in Somalia," Strategic Survey (London: Brassey's, 1992), 178-181.

⁸ The Joint Military Net Assessment, 1-4.

⁹ Ibid, 179.

¹⁰ Keith B. Richburg, "The Warlord in Charge of Somalia's Misery," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition 7 (September 1992), 16.

¹¹ In May 1991, the northern half of the country (former British Somaliland) seceded under the leadership of Abdur-ahman Ahmed Ali (of the Issaq clan), having been shut out for the fight for Mogadishu by distance. This part of Soma-

lia, unrecognized by any nation, presents problems for the adjacent nations of Ethiopia and Djibouti, both of which have significant Somali minorities.

¹² Carla Anne Robbins, "Waiting for America," US News and World Report 113 (December 7, 1992), 26.

¹³ Germany, France, Canada, and Italy are the others.

¹⁴ Don Oberdorfer, "The Road to Somalia," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition 10 (December 14-20, 1992), 6.

¹⁵ Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once...And Young (New York: Random House, 1992), 11-14. US Marines went ashore in South Vietnam on 8 March 1965, about a month after a particularly vicious attack on an adviser base camp near Pleiku. During that month of relative inactivity on the ground, the Air Force and Navy executed Operation Rolling Thunder, systematic airstrikes against North Vietnam. By 15 April 1965, over 60,000 troops were committed to duty in Vietnam.

¹⁶ The Deputies Committee consists of the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense, the Deputy National Security Advisor, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other principal deputies of the National Security Committee.

¹⁷ Oberdorfer, "The Road to Somalia," 6.

¹⁸ Carla Anne Robbins, "Waiting for America," US News and World Report 113 (December 7, 1992), 27.

¹⁹ Unlike Operation Desert Shield and then Desert Storm, the US news media devoted more attention to general stories about establishment of security, rarely showing or even mentioning the daily military briefing or interviewing the military commander, Marine LTG Robert Johnston. By contrast, both the daily briefing as well as interviews with the US commander, GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf were a staple of press reports during the Persian Gulf War.

²⁰ Eric Ransdell, "Strangers in a Strange Land," US News and World Report 113 (December 21, 1992), 64.

²¹ Mike Tharp, "A Dilemma on the Horn," US News and World Report 114 (January 18, 1993), 50.

²² William Branigin, "A Costly Way to Keep the Peace," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition 10 (December 7-13, 1992), 9-10.

- ²³ Keith B. Richburg, "Our Man in Somalia Casts a Long Shadow," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition 10 (February 8-14, 1993), 18.
- ²⁴ Dennis Steele, "Army Units Deploy to Assist Starving, War-Torn Somalia," Army 43 (February 1993), 27.
- ²⁵ Edmund J. Gannon, Subsaharan Africa: An Introduction, (Washington DC: Council on American Affairs, 1978), 108.
- ²⁶ Kaye Whiteman, "Liberia," The Africa Review 1991/92 (Edison, NJ: Hunter Publishing, 1992), 115. Based on a 1988 census.
- ²⁷ J. Coleman Kitchen, "Some Key Dates in Liberia's Political History," CSIS Africa Notes 129 (October 28, 1991): 3.
- ²⁸ Peter da Costa "The Plot Thickens," West Africa 3812 (September 17-23, 1990), 1041.
- ²⁹ A Conversation with Liberia's Interim President," CSIS Africa Notes 129 (October 28, 1991): 1-5.
- ³⁰ Tom Masland and Jeffrey Bartholet, "The Perils of Peace-keeping," Newsweek 120 (November 16, 1992) 53.
- ³¹ Richburg, "Our Man in Somalia," 18.
- ³² Peter da Costa, "A Solution to the Liberia Quagmire?" The Africa Review 1991/92 (September/October 1992) 25.
- ³³ Martin Lowenkopf, "What Can We Hope For/Expect in a Clinton Africa Policy?" CSIS Africa Notes 143 (December 1992) 3.
- ³⁴ Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 340 (1973), 27 October 1973.
- ³⁵ The Joint Military Net Assessment, 1-4.
- ³⁶ President of the United States George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 20, and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 24.
- ³⁷ Donald M. Snow, Third World Conflict and American Response in the Post-Cold War World, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1991) 28-32. Snow's booklet actually outlines five critical areas, but only four apply to the concept of adaptability.

²⁰ Dennis C. Weeks, "The AIDS Pandemic in Africa," Current History (May 1992) 208-213.

Chapter 5

¹ Thomas P. Odom, Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988), 16. In August 1964, JTF Leo arrived in Leopoldville, Congo, as part of a plan to rescue Western hostages in the wake of the fall of Stanleyville, Congo, to rebel forces.

² General Colin Powell, 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces (Washington DC: Office of the CJCS, 10 Feb 93), III-2 to III-7.

³ Eric Ransdell and Carla Anne Robbins, "Operation Restore Hope," US News and World Report 23, (December 1992): 26-30.

⁴ Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 24.

⁵ Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, interviewed on CBS Television This Week with David Brinkley, December 20, 1992.

⁶ David Lamb, The Africans (New York: Random House, 1982), 20-23. Africa's poverty is a direct contrast to its wealth: 40 percent of the world's potential hydroelectric power, 50 percent of the world's gold, 90 percent of the world's cobalt, 50 percent of its phosphate, 40 percent of its platinum, 8 percent of its petroleum, and 7.5 percent of its coal.

APPENDIX





Figure 1. Strategic Analysis Methodology



*The Strategic Air Command became a Unified Command in 1991.

Figure 2. Evolution of the Operational Command Structure






Figure 3. The Unified Command Plan (Graphic Depiction).



* Canada, Spain, Brazil, Netherlands, Australia, Ukraine, Belgium, Sweden,
 ** All Remaining 164 Members


Figure 4. United Nations Budget Assessment

Africa



801549 (547147) 8-90

Figure 5. Political Map of Africa



Base 802100 (B00621) 12 92

Figure 6. Political Map of Somalia




Figure 7. Political Map of Liberia

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